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Real Masks and Real Name Policies:
Applying Anti-Mask Case Law to
Anonymous Online Speech
Margot Kaminski*
The First Amendment protects anonymous speech, but the
scope of that protection has been the subject of much debate. This
Article adds to the discussion of anonymous speech by examining
anti-mask statutes and cases as an analogue for the regulation of
anonymous speech online. Anti-mask case law answers a number
of questions left open by the Supreme Court. It shows that courts
have used the First Amendment to protect anonymity beyond core
political speech, when mask-wearing is expressive conduct or
shows a nexus with free expression. This Article explores what the
anti-mask cases teach us about anonymity online, including
proposed real-name policies. It closes by returning to the real
world of real masks, addressing the significance of physical
anonymity in an age of remote biometric identification and drone
use.

*
Lecturer in Law at Yale Law School and Executive Director of the Information
Society Project at Yale Law School. Many thanks to M. Ryan Calo, Bryan H. Choi, A.
Michael Froomkin, Chris Hoofnagle, and other workshop participants at the 2012 Privacy
Law Scholars Conference (PLSC) for their helpful comments and suggestions.
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INTRODUCTION
Anonymity can be a shield against the tyranny of the majority,
or a mask used to protect the perpetrator of a crime.1 The Supreme
Court has held that the First Amendment protects anonymous
speech.2 In recent years, however, lower courts have recognized
how challenging it is to protect an unqualified right to anonymous
expression when anonymity is used by the perpetrators of legal
harms. Courts have converged on a standard for a more qualified
right to anonymity online.3
Most scholarly discussion of
anonymity focuses on this recently developed John Doe subpoena
standard. But courts addressed the puzzle of anonymity’s
relationship to speech prior to the Doe standard. States enacted
anti-mask statutes as early as 1845, and various courts have
evaluated those statutes under the First Amendment since the
1960s.4 This Article examines how courts have treated anti-mask
statutes, and compares that treatment to the Doe standard and
Supreme Court jurisprudence on anonymity. Anti-mask case law
and Doe case law turn out to inform each other in fascinating
ways.
The core puzzle of anonymity is also its core value: anonymity
protects speakers from both social stigma and legal enforcement.
In a repressive regime, anonymity allows dissidents to protest
against the government without fear of arrest, or worse. In a
1
McIntyre v. Ohio, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (observing that anonymity can “protect
unpopular individuals from retaliation . . . at the hand of an intolerant society” and
provide a “shield from the tyranny of the majority”). But see A. Michael Froomkin,
Anonymity and its Enmities, 1995 J. ONLINE L. art. 4, ¶¶ 44–46 (1995), available at
http://groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/articles/anonymity/froomkin.html
[hereinafter Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities].
2
See generally McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 334 (holding that “the freedom to publish
anonymously is protected by the First Amendment”).
3
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Anonymity in Cyberspace: What Can We Learn from John
Doe?, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1373, 1378 (2009) (describing the converging Doe standards
employed by lower courts).
4
See People v. Aboaf, 187 Misc. 2d 173, 183, 721 N.Y.S.2d 725, 733 (Crim. Ct.
2001) (discussing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(4) (LexisNexis 2012)) (observing that an
early 1845 New York anti-mask law arose out of demonstrations and riots by anti-rent
protestors disguised as Indians); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); see, e.g.,
Schumann v. State of New York, 270 F. Supp. 730, 731–32 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); see also
Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 94 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Ghafari v. Mun. Court, 87 Cal.
App. 3d 255, 259 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
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democracy, anonymity allows authors to be judged on the merits of
their words alone, and whistleblowers to come forward without
fear of getting fired. But to a government, anonymity can be
coterminous with untraceability, preventing perpetrators from
being discovered and laws from being enforced.5 And to an online
publisher, anonymity can encourage nasty online comments
unchecked by social feedback or social consequences.
Can the government impose a blanket ban on anonymity to
thwart the masked and uncatchable bank robber, at the expense of
the mask-wearing protester? The answer to this question has
consequences in both the real world and the world online. The
proliferation of both online trolls and offline revolutionaries has
led governments around the world to adopt online real-name
policies, where individuals are required to register their real
identity with their Internet Service Provider (ISP) or Online
Service Provider (OSP), or receive a state-assigned identity
number.6 Scholars have called for a similar registration regime in
the United States,7 and legislation requiring online identification
was recently proposed in New York.8 This Article addresses
whether such a regime would be constitutional under the First
Amendment. I conclude, based on anti-mask case law, that it
would not be constitutional, due to the overbreadth of such a
statute and the chilling of a great deal of protected speech. A
blanket real-world ban on anonymity similarly chills protected
expression; and physical anonymity is becoming increasingly
important in today’s surveillance society.9

5

Bryan H. Choi, The Anonymous Internet, 72 MD. L. REV. 501 (forthcoming),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2005941.
6
See e.g., Choi, supra note 5, at 534 (discussing how China and South Korea have
been at the forefront of imposing “real name” requirements).
7
See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 67 (2009);
Choi, supra note 5, at 531–32.
8
Chenda Ngak, New York Lawmakers Propose Ban on Anonymous Online
Comments, CBS NEWS (May 24, 2012, 11:46 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301501465_162-57440895-501465/new-york-lawmakers-propose-ban-on-anonymousonline-comments.
9
See Laura K. Donohue, Technological Leap, Statutory Gap, and Constitutional
Abyss: Remote Biometric Identification Comes of Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 407, 425 (2012)
(outlining the development of federal biometric and facial identification programs).
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A related and equally important question is when, precisely,
unidentifiability ceases to be an instrument and becomes protected
speech. We do not give First Amendment protection to the person
who chooses not to put a license plate on her car, so when do we
give protection to the person wearing a mask? The Doe
scholarship and cases fail to address this question, because the
online anonymity they address is inextricably intertwined with
speech. When you make a comment online under a pseudonym,
you have at some point written down that pseudonym. Anti-mask
case law, by contrast, struggles deeply with the dividing line
between expression and instrumentality, often employing the
O’Brien test to determine when mask-wearing is symbolic
speech.10 Perhaps surprisingly, anti-mask case law also shows that
anonymity can be connected to speech even when it is purely
functional in nature, because courts recognize that anonymity’s
functionality can enable expression or association.
The third question raised by both anti-mask statutes and online
policies is whether untraceability creates enough of a state interest
that untraceable anonymity can always be banned. It turns out that
in many cases, untraceability is not a concern. Anonymity usually
exists on a continuum of traceability. Often, anonymity or
pseudonymity creates an extra layer of obscurity, rather than
enabling true untraceability.11 For example, the Doe defendants
online are not untraceable; their identities are knowable through
websites and Internet service providers. The Doe cases arise
precisely because the law both creates a mechanism for discovery
of the Does’ identities, and raises additional hurdles to that
discovery in the name of free speech. This continuum of
traceability exists offline as well. Masked individuals are not
untraceable; they are just more difficult to trace, and require the
use of other kinds of deduction and forensic evidence. Given the
10

United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
For discussion of the related idea of an “obscurity continuum,” see Woodrow
Hartzog & Frederick Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4
(2013) (“[I]nformation is obscure online if it lacks one or more key factors that are
essential to discovery or comprehension. We have identified four of these factors: (1)
search visibility, (2) unprotected access, (3) identification, and (4) clarity . . . . Courts
could use an obscurity continuum when determining if certain information is eligible for
privacy protections.”).
11
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legal scholarship’s repeated focus on traceability in online
anonymous speech, what is perhaps most surprising in the antimask case law is how little of a focus courts place on the state
interest in traceability.
This Article begins with a discussion of anonymity and
pseudonymity, and the relationship between anonymity and
traceability. Part II discusses related Supreme Court case law.
Part III examines anti-mask case law to determine how courts have
treated government bans of real masks. Part IV asks whether these
cases teach us anything about anonymity online, including recently
proposed real-name policies. Part V returns to the real world of
real masks, and addresses the significance of physical anonymity
in the age of remote biometric identification and aerial drones.
Part VI connects online anonymity to anti-mask laws more broadly
speaking, by briefly discussing what the Internet has in common
with freedom of assembly offline.
I. ANONYMITY AND ITS FEATURES
There are different kinds of anonymity. Some kinds of
anonymity may be more expressive than others, and some may be
more dangerous than others. Online speech arguably permits a
different kind of anonymity than offline speech. Online speech
may be untraceable; that is, the speaker’s identity might never be
revealed.
Existing scholarship either concludes that untraceable online
anonymity is essential to protect dissidents,12 or deplores the fact
that untraceability enables harms to others.13 One scholar recently
suggested that online untraceability causes states to restrict the
development of new technologies as part of law enforcement
12

See, e.g., A. Michael Froomkin, Flood Control on the Information Ocean: Living
with Anonymity, Digital Cash, and Distributed Databases, 15 J.L. & COM. 395, 429
(1996) (explaining that “[t]he Supreme Court has . . . tended to be highly solicitous of the
need of dissidents . . . to speak anonymously when they have a credible fear of retaliation
for what they say”) [hereinafter Froomkin, Flood Control].
13
See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61, 62 (2009)
(“Social networking sites and blogs have increasingly become breeding grounds for
anonymous online groups that attack women, people of color, and members of other
traditionally disadvantaged groups.”).

C02_KAMINSKI (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

REAL MASKS AND REAL NAME POLICIES

4/17/2013 2:41 PM

821

efforts.14 If that is the case, we may have to choose between the
twin values of anonymity and innovation.
The difference between types of anonymity leads to open
questions about First Amendment doctrine: does the Supreme
Court intend that all anonymity must be equally protected, or does
some anonymity have less expressive value than others? Is it
possible that some anonymity receives less protection under a
balancing test because it may be inherently more harmful than
other kinds?
A. Definition
There are four types of anonymity, or more accurately, identity
obfuscation: (1) traceable anonymity, (2) untraceable anonymity,
(3) traceable pseudonymity, and (4) untraceable pseudonymity.15
This taxonomy disentangles the audience’s ability to identify the
author from the author’s choice of whether to self-identify.
Untraceable anonymity arises when the author or speaker both
does not identify herself, and is ultimately not identifiable. This
form of anonymity is extremely difficult to achieve in the real
world, due to the increasing prevalence of forensic evidence. In
the real world, untraceability is a temporal and effort-based
concept; one can be truly untraceable only for a period of time,
until resource expenditure over time eventually reveals one’s
identity.16 Online, untraceability is more easily achievable, and
herein lies the appeal of, and justification for, regulation of online
anonymity for many governments.17 Governments fear that
complete untraceability will permit the perfect crime.18
Increasingly, however, most people online are traceable
through intermediaries or other identifiers. Traceable anonymity
creates a temporary experience of anonymity, but leaves
identifying information in the hands of an intermediary or registry
14

Choi, supra note 5, at 541 (explaining that “[t]he trouble with using technology to
elevate anonymity of the law is that it turns the enabling technology into a target”).
15
Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities, supra note 1, at ¶¶ 11–40.
16
See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1381 (2000).
17
Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 418, 427.
18
Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities, note 1, at ¶¶ 44–45.
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of some sort. In reality, most anonymous people online are
traceably anonymous.19 The upcoming switch to IPv6 makes it
even harder to go untraced online in the absence of deliberately
deploying anonymizing software like Tor.20
Traceable anonymity is often advocated as a compromise
between identity play and societal safety. In the context of a civil
lawsuit or criminal investigation, traceable anonymity allows
plaintiffs to identify an online speaker. But the problem with
traceable anonymity is that the online speaker may not be aware
that she is traceable when she speaks, and in authoritarian regimes
or with overeager litigants, the consequences can be dire. This is
why courts have developed the Doe standard, to prevent misuse of
the subpoena process through the filing of frivolous lawsuits to
discover the identity of an anonymous critic.
One can also be unidentifiable while not being truly
anonymous, if one adopts a pseudonym. The difference between
pseudonymity and anonymity is interesting and under-theorized.
Pseudonymity allows for the adoption of a developing, ongoing
identity that can itself develop an image and reputation.21
Pseudonymous individuals presumably abstain from abusing others
more than anonymous individuals, because of the importance of
ongoing reputation in pseudonymous communicative contexts.22
Or, perversely, pseudonymous individuals may be encouraged to
abuse others, depending on the type of social reputation that
matters most to them.23 Pseudonyms can also be adopted by

19

Citron, supra note 7, at 123–24.
Duncan B. Hollis, An e-SOS for Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 399 n.172
(2011); see also TOR PROJECT, https://www.torproject.org.
21
Interview with A. Michael Froomkin, Professor of Law, University of Miami School
of Law (regarding the Privacy Law Scholars Conference 2012). Anonymity is more
appropriate for discrete one-off actions, although it can become clear in the context of
one conversation that the same person is behind a given stream of comments. Id.
22
See Jennifer Van Grove, Data Suggests People Using Pseudonyms Leave Better
Comments, VENTURE BEAT (Jan. 15, 2012), http://venturebeat.com/2012/01/15/
pseudonyms-vs-real-names (observing that sixty-one percent of comments made by
people using pseudonyms showed positive quality signals, compared to thirty-four
percent from anonymous commenters and fifty-one percent from real name commenters).
23
Citron, supra note 7, at 83.
20
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numerous people at once, allowing for a shared voice and shared
identity.24
Pseudonymity has implications for First Amendment doctrine,
because it always involves a conscious choice of an alternate
name. By contrast, anonymity is sometimes attained through
passivity, rather than through active speech. Supreme Court
doctrine refers to anonymity as an editorial choice, where the
author chooses to speak a different name, or to not speak at all.25
However, in anti-mask cases, lower courts’ tendency to view
anonymity as conduct suggests that the distinction between
anonymity and pseudonymity might be revisited in online contexts
where anonymity does not involve words. Anonymity might be
seen as conduct, while pseudonymity by virtue of the use of words
must always be expressive.
Like anonymity, pseudonymity can be split into two categories:
traceable and untraceable. Untraceable pseudonymity occurs when
an author identifies herself through a pseudonym, but is not
ultimately identifiable. Traceable pseudonymity again allows
somebody to eventually trace the identity of the author.26 From a
policy perspective, these do not differ measurably from
untraceable anonymity or traceable anonymity. From a freeexpression-focused perspective, however, pseudonymity represents
a conscious choice to “speak” a different name than one’s own.
B. Is Anonymity Good or Bad?
Anonymous online speech has received a lot of attention, both
scholarly and in the popular press, in recent years. Some argue
that anonymity is essential to a functioning democracy, allowing
minorities and whistleblowers to speak without fearing
repercussion.27 Others point out that anonymity enables nasty

24

Thanks to Nabiha Syed for identifying this phenomenon. For an example, the
popular author “Ellery Queen,” is a joint pseudonym of Daniel Nathan and Manfred
Lepofsky. See Joyce Carol Oates, Pseudonymous Selves, USF CELESTIAL TIMEPIECE,
available at http://www.usfca.edu/jco/pseudonyms (last visited Apr. 3, 2013).
25
See McIntyre v. Ohio, 514 U.S. 336, 341 (1995).
26
Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities, supra note 1, at ¶ 36.
27
See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Thomas F. Cotter, Authorship, Audiences, and
Anonymous Speech, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1537, 1574 (2007) (noting that anonymity
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behavior such as harassment and stalking, with no social
consequences.28 The issue has been hotly debated in the online
context because anonymity is a feature of the early Internet that
has gradually been disappearing as private companies, the forums
for online communication, turn to real-name policies for business
and other reasons.29
Anonymity can promote certain kinds of desirable speech, and
arguably can increase the total amount of speech.30 It can also,
however, cloak bad behavior and have other negative effects.31
Allowing anonymous speech arguably benefits both speakers
and audience.32 To some, the First Amendment’s goal is to protect
speakers; to others, the First Amendment provides value to society
as a whole, through the creation of a vibrant and egalitarian
marketplace of ideas.33 In this second view, although the First
Amendment right belongs to the speaker, the value of the speech
depends on the audience.34 Thus in the following discussion I

engenders the opinions of people, such as the less wealthy and powerful, who might not
otherwise choose to partake in the public discourse).
28
See, e.g., Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability:
Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1642–43 (1995)
(stating that anonymity results in less civilized and more outrageous behavior); Nathaniel
Gleicher, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard, 118 YALE L. J.
320, 324 (2008) (noting that anonymity spurs gossip, defamation, harassment, and
enables “[f]aceless crowds of online tormentors wield virtual pitchforks, carry virtual
torches, and hound innocent targets into hiding and out of the online world entirely”).
29
Margot Kaminski, Reading Over Your Shoulder: Social Readers and Privacy Law, 2
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 13, 14 (2012) (discussing how Facebook’s and Google’s policy
that users register with their real names facilitates advertising and encourages civil user
comments).
30
The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure and the Devil, 70
YALE L.J. 1084, 1112 (1961) (explaining that disclosure may deter speech and
accordingly inhibit certain ideas from being shared).
31
See Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 402 (explaining that anonymous
communication facilitates engagement in miscreant behavior such as conspiracy, hateful
speech, electronic stalking, and libel).
32
Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1539–40.
33
See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 143, 176–77 (2010) (contrasting free speech libertarians with free speech
egalitarians).
34
Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1539–40 (demonstrating the concern with the
speaker and the audience in both a positive and normative analysis of anonymous
speech).
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focus first on the value of anonymous speech to speakers, and then
on the value of anonymous speech to an audience.
From a speaker’s perspective, anonymity can protect a speaker
from any costs incurred by speaking, including retaliation and
social ostracism.35 Because anonymity protects authors from costs,
it can permit speech that otherwise would be “chilled.”36 As the
Supreme Court has noted, anonymity can thus empower the
minority author to speak against the majority opinion.37 This
protection from costs allows authors to engage in minority political
speech and “whistle-blowing.”38
Anonymity also provides
protection for those speakers who are being stalked or harassed,
allowing them to seek information and counseling without fearing
the more intimate reprisal from a harasser or an abusive exboyfriend.
Anonymity can additionally allow an author to obtain collateral
benefits that could be more costly if his or her identity is known.39
An author can thus speak about an area entwined with her own
interests and not fear that the audience will discount the
information based on the author’s identity.40 This feature of
anonymity puts authors’ interests in tension with the audience’s
interests, as the ability to gain collateral benefits might be good for
the author but bad for the audience.41

35

Id. at 1568 (referring to two kinds of costs: “Wrongful Retaliation,” a private cost
that results from speaking truthfully, and “Justifiable Retaliation,” a private cost that
results from speaking falsely).
36
Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation and Discourse in Cyberspace, 48 DUKE L.
J. 855, 888 (2000) (explaining the chilling effect to be the self-censorship people practice
to avoid the repercussions of speaking, a result of defamation law) [hereinafter Lidsky,
Silencing John Doe].
37
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995); Victoria Smith
Ekstrand, Unmasking Jane and John Doe: Online Anonymity and the First Amendment, 8
COMM. L. & POL’Y 405, 413 (“[A]nonymous speech protects and advances the minority
viewpoint, which might otherwise face discrimination.”).
38
Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities, supra note 1, at ¶ 7. (“[C]ommunicative
autonomy allows users to engage in political speech without fear of retribution, to engage
in whistle-blowing while running a greatly reduced risk of detection.”).
39
Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1568.
40
Id. at 1575–76.
41
Id. at 1540.
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Anonymity can allow an author to “play,” or experiment with
identities or ideologies that differ from his or her real identity and
may differ from the acceptable norm.42 This identity “play”
includes permitting better known authors to cast aside their social
and artistic identity and start afresh.43 Anonymity allows a person
to associate with a particular group or particular religion of which
others disapprove.44 It allows an author to form a new self or
engage in a new community. Historically, pseudonyms may have
been adopted for class-related reasons, because they allowed a
gentleman author to compete with “scribblers,” and lower-class
writers to gain the authority of gentlemen.45
In addition to external benefits, an anonymous author may
derive internal satisfaction from speaking without attribution.46 An
author may specifically wish to escape her previous reputation in
order to have her message taken seriously.47 Or a particularly
timorous author may be encouraged to step beyond that timidity
and take on an authoritative voice.48 An author whose viewpoint
may be judged based on age, sex, race, or national origin may use
anonymity to escape bigotry and stereotyping and be judged solely
on quality of the message.49 To repurpose a comment made about

42

See id. at 22.
See Oates, supra note 24.
44
NAACP v. Alabama, 78 S. Ct. 1163, 1171–72 (1958) (explaining that privacy in
one’s associations, be it with a religious faith or political group, is often essential if
people are to have freedom of association).
45
Chesa Boudin, Publius and the Petition: Doe v. Reed and the History of Anonymous
Speech, 120 YALE L.J. 2140, 2155 n.66 (2011) (explaining that there may also have been
class-based reasons for the common use of pseudonyms). Adair suggests “[a] gentleman
lost caste if he wrote professionally in competition with mere scribblers; and conversely,
a lower-class professional writer concealed behind a nom de plume could gain authority
by writing as if he were a gentleman.” Id. (quoting DOUGLASS ADAIR, FAME AND THE
FOUNDING FATHERS 386 n.1 (Trevor Colbourn ed., Liberty Fund 1998) (1974)).
46
Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1568.
47
See id. at 1577 (describing what Lidsky and Cotter refer to as “The Boy who Cried
Wolf” rationale, which occurs from the speaker’s realization that the public will discount
the speech, and accordingly be harmed, if it knows the source); see also Oates, supra note
24.
48
See Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 408.
49
See id. at 409.
43
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the Internet, anonymity “not only removes barriers to speaking; it
also removes barriers to being heard.”50
From an audience’s perspective, anonymity can increase the
amount of speech, which at a minimum allows for greater variety
in the marketplace of ideas.51 Anonymity can allow for the
distribution of particularly valuable speech that otherwise would
not be made, such as when whistleblowers and other less powerful
individuals speak up against the status quo and provide useful
information.52 Anonymity can also benefit the audience by
preventing it from judging an idea based on the identity or
background of a particular author, when that identity would
unfairly bias the audience against the author’s point of view.53
Anonymity allows for more uninhibited information-seeking.54
Although this feature technically concerns authors rather than
audiences, it is at an intersection with audience interests because
the authors become audience members as they ask for
information.55 Anonymity allows individuals to seek answers to
private or semi-private embarrassing questions.56 This allows
them to avoid shame or embarrassment, a fear distinct from

50

Lidsky, Silencing John Doe, supra note 36, at 895.
Choi, supra note 5, at 524–25 (describing this as a macroeconomic benefit to the
marketplace of ideas).
52
See id.
53
See id. (“[I]n a microeconomic sense, an individual idea becomes more competitive
within the existing market when identifying information is withheld, because readers are
forced to judge it on its merits without being biased by the identity or background of the
author.”); see also Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1577 (describing the “Boy Who
Cried Wolf” feature of anonymity).
54
See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1574.
55
Id.
56
See, e.g., Ekstrand, supra note 37, at 413 (explaining that anonymity protects private
information); Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 576, 578 (N.D. Cal.
1999) (“[I]t permits persons to obtain information relevant to a sensitive or intimate
condition without fear or embarrassment.”); Ekstrand, supra note 37, at 413 (explaining
that anonymity protects private information); Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities,
supra note 1, at ¶ 7 (“[C]ommunicative anonymity allows users . . . to seek advice about
embarrassing personal problems without fear of discovery.”); Froomkin, Flood Control,
supra note 12, at 408 (“Communicative anonymity encourages people to post requests for
information to public bulletin boards about matters they may find too personal to discuss
if there were any chance that the message might be traced back to its origin.”).
51
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retaliation.57 The protection of potentially shameful informationseeking may in turn have larger positive benefits for society,
including the enhancement of public health.58
Allowing anonymous speech, however, also allows for harms,
from both an author’s and an audience’s perspective.59 Anonymity
can have a “disinhibiting effect,” separating the speaker from the
immediate consequences of her speech.60 This can cause an author
to feel safer from consequences than she actually is.61 That same
disinhibiting effect can lead to the spread of gossip, defamation,
and harassment.62
The anonymity of some authors may in fact prevent the speech
of other authors.63 Online harassment by a group can subjugate
and drown out the minority voice, potentially chilling more speech
than it generates.64 This has led one scholar to call for an
assessment of the Doe standard under the public figure doctrine,
with an eye towards how effectively the target of harassing speech
can protect himself in a public forum.65 Anonymity is not just a
shield against the tyranny of the majority; it can also “enable[] a
majority to terrorize the few.”66
Anonymous speech may be less valuable to its audience from
an informational standpoint than named speech; the audience
receives no information about speaker identity and thus must rely

57

Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1568, 1572 (comparing authors’ motivation to
maintain anonymity due to a concern about ensuing that authors may want to prevent
“shame, humiliation, or social ostracism” with those who are concerned about
retaliation).
58
Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 408–09.
59
Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1539 (noting that authors of anonymous speech
are more likely to be disregarded and audiences of anonymous speech are more likely to
be harmed by the tortuous or deleterious speech).
60
Id. at 1575.
61
See id.
62
Id. (“Since the Internet magnifies the number of anonymous speakers, it also
magnifies the likelihood of false and abusive speech.”).
63
Gleicher, supra note 28, at 324–25.
64
Id. at 325 (“[A]nonymous harassing speech may reduce, rather than enhance, the
amount and quality of online speech.”).
65
See id. at 334.
66
Id. at 324.
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upon other indicia of reliability.67 Anonymity can thus give rise to
unverifiable speech.68 It can make it more difficult for an audience
“to identify the self interest or bias underlying an argument.”69
Transparency and anonymity can be competing values. The
Supreme Court has recognized this tension, and seems to have
recognized that in the electoral context, transparency should trump
anonymity.70
As mentioned, the most significant feature of anonymity from a
law enforcement perspective is that anonymity is in general “a
great tool for evading detection of illegal and immoral activity,”
which can lead to the proliferation of both illegal and immoral
speech as the disincentive structure changes.71 “Hate-speech” and
“general nastiness,” in addition to illegal activity “become lowerrisk activities if conducted via anonymous communications.”72
When anonymity is used to perform illegal acts, it gets in the way
of the enforcement of rules that could otherwise benefit society.73
Completely untraceable anonymity can allow for the “perfect
crime[].”74 A government that cannot regulate anonymity may
instead regulate technology, with bad collateral effects on
innovative platforms.75
Thus from an audience perspective, even if there is more
speech, that increase in speech might be “bad.”76 As Robert Post
has observed, certain restrictions on speech, such as defamation

67

Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1559.
Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 403; Lidsky, Silencing John Doe, supra
note 36, at 862–63.
69
Id. (quoting Note, The Constitutional Right to Anonymity: Free Speech, Disclosure
and the Devil, 70 YALE L.J. 1084, 1111 (1961)).
70
Boudin, supra note 45, at 2172.
71
Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 402–03.
72
Id. at 402.
73
See, e.g., Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 404 (“Anonymous
communication . . . poses particularly stark enforcement problems for libel law and
intellectual property law.”).
74
Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities, supra note 1, at ¶ 44.
75
Choi, supra note 5, at 520–22.
76
Id. at 403; see also Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1556 (noting that anonymity
can be seen as “bad” because of the number of speakers abusing this right).
68
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law, can help make meaningful discourse possible, in addition to
protecting dignitary interests.77
Finally, just as anonymity can be intrinsically valuable, it can
also be intrinsically harmful.78 In anti-mask cases, anonymity is
often seen as inherently threatening.79 This arises in the context of
the long line of historical intimidation using masks by the Ku Klux
Klan.80 But it is also articulated in broader terms.81 Masks and
lack of identity can be inherently frightening.82 The discomfort of
an audience, however, is not an adequate policy reason—or an
adequate reason under the First Amendment—for banning
anonymity.
C. Should Anonymity be Banned?
Despite these dangers, a number of factors weigh in the favor
of protecting anonymous speech. Attempts to regulate against
harmful anonymity are often overbroad, and create collateral
censorship of perfectly legitimate speech.83 The First Amendment
requires “breathing space” for protected speech to flourish, even if
that means incurring harms.84
Blanket identity registration requirements change the nature of
speech by deterring spontaneous anonymous speech.
This

77

Lidsky, Silencing John Doe, supra note 36, at 886 (citing Robert C. Post, The Social
Foundations of Defamation Law: Reputation and the Constitution, 74 CAL. L. REV. 691,
713 (1986)).
78
Ekstrand, supra note 37, at 407.
79
See, e.g., Choi, supra note 5, at 538–39 (stating that in cases dealing with the KKK
and Communist Party, anonymity was not appropriate because the groups’ messages and
actions were too perilous).
80
See, e.g., id. at 38, n.196 (citing Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v.
Kerik, 356 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004). See generally Hernandez v. Superintendent, 800 F.
Supp. 1344 (E.D. Va. 1992)).
81
See, e.g., Choi, supra note 5, at 538, n.197 (citing Communist Party of the U.S. v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109, 126 (1959)).
82
NAACP v. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 465 (1958) (noting that certain mask groups
such as the KKK committed “acts of unlawful intimidation”).
83
Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 402 (“Some . . . argue . . . the harms
(e.g., censorship) associated with trying to ban anonymity are not worth any benefits that
could ensue.”).
84
Id.
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rationale has come up at least twice in Supreme Court case law.85
In Thomas v. Collins, for example, the Supreme Court found that
registration requirements were “incompatible” with the First
Amendment.86 In Watchtower Bible, the Court feared that
upholding a registration requirement for door-to-door
noncommercial solicitation would prevent neighbors from going to
each other’s houses to talk.87 Spontaneity thus has its own First
Amendment value that is implicated in discussions of anonymity
and identity registration requirements.88
Historical tradition also suggests that we afford strong
protections for anonymity. The United States has a recognized
tradition of anonymous pamphleteering.89 This national history
was a driving force behind the Supreme Court’s decisions in Talley
and McIntyre,90 with one scholar noting that “[a]nonymous
publications have profoundly shaped American history going back
to the colonial era.”91
The United States also has a historical preference for more
speech rather than less, and protecting anonymity would be in
keeping with this tradition as well. The First Amendment assumes
that audiences are capable of rationally assessing the
characteristics of speech, and assumes that more speech is
generally preferable to less.92 The truth is best gathered “out of a
multitude of tongues.”93
85
See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 539 (1945) (stating that “a requirement of
registration in order to make a public speech would seem generally incompatible with an
exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly”); see also Watchtower Bible v.
Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 165–66 (2002) (stating that “[i]t is offensive . . . to the
very notion of a free society that . . . a citizen must first inform the government of [their]
desire to speak to [their] neighbors and then obtain a permit”).
86
Thomas, 323 U.S. at 540.
87
See Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. at 165–66.
88
See id.
89
See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960); see also McIntyre v. Ohio, 514
U.S. 334, 360 (1995).
90
Jocelyn Hanamirian, The Right to Remain Anonymous: Anonymous Speakers,
Confidential Sources and the Public Good, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 119, 123 n.24 (2011).
91
See Boudin, supra note 45, at 2152.
92
Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: The Rational Audience as First
Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 810–11.
93
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff’d, 326
U.S. 1 (1945)).
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Anonymity is, at its foundation, about power. Mandating the
retention of identity information puts a great deal of power in the
hands of the government. It makes it difficult for individuals to
speak out about unpopular issues, especially issues that are
unpopular to the government.94 Attacking or punishing the tools
that provide anonymity, whether online tools such as Tor or realworld tools such as masks, is an overbroad measure, and
exacerbates a fundamental imbalance of power between
individuals and their government.95
As A. Michael Froomkin has pointed out, “the debate about
anonymity . . . is in effect a debate about the degree of political and
economic freedom that will be fostered, or tolerated, in a modern
society.”96 Given how few individuals are actually untraceable
both offline and online—most people register information with
third parties such as their ISPs, and in the real world, forensic
evidence is increasingly accurate—a blanket ban on anonymity
sacrifices traditionally held freedoms for perhaps unnecessarily
heightened security concerns.97 Many criminals will likely not be
deterred from using anonymity-protecting tools if we ban the tools,
and many individuals will be swept into the ban who need the
protection anonymity provides.
II. SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court has not always been protective of
anonymity, just as it has not always provided strong First
Amendment protections. But in a series of cases starting in the
1960s, the Supreme Court recognized that anonymity is protected
by the First Amendment. However, Supreme Court doctrine
leaves a number of important questions unanswered, with
implications for both online real name policies and anti-mask laws.

94

Boudin, supra note 45, at 2155 (Authors that choose to remain anonymous often do
so to avoid retaliation for speaking out about unpopular issues.).
95
Id. at 2166 (noting that the Court’s decision in Talley reasoned that ordinances were
often overly broad, despite achieving the state’s interest).
96
Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 401–02.
97
Id. at 424 (discussing the scenarios in which users register for Internet services with
credit cards).
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A. Supreme Court Cases
In 1928, the Supreme Court held that a Ku Klux Klan’s
membership list was not protected from disclosure to the state.98
The value of transparency to the state was worth more than the
Klan’s interest in keeping membership lists private. The Court
reasoned that the state was entitled to be informed about
associations within its territory.99
However, in 1958 the Supreme Court distinguished the 1928
case by referring to the violent historical nature of the Klan’s
activities.100 The Court found in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson that Alabama failed to provide sufficient justification for
revealing an NAACP membership list of “rank-and-file”
members.101
The Court linked privacy with freedom of
association, explaining that the “[i]nviolability of privacy in group
association may in many circumstances be indispensable to
preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group
espouses dissident beliefs.”102 On many past occasions, revealing
the identity of NAACP members had caused them to be subject to
“manifestations of public hostility.”103 The state failed to
demonstrate an interest “sufficient to justify the deterrent effect . . .
[on] their constitutionally protected right of association.”104
In 1960, the Supreme Court articulated a broader anonymous
speech right, disaggregated from freedom of association, in Talley
v. California.105 Talley challenged a Los Angeles ordinance that
required persons distributing handbills to print their name and
address on the cover of the handbill.106 California argued that the
ordinance was intended to identify individuals responsible for
fraud, false advertising, and libel. However, the ordinance applied

98

People of New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 77 (1928).
Id. at 65.
100
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 465 (1958) (reasoning that the
Klan in Zimmerman historically partook in “acts of unlawful intimidation and violence”).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 462.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 463.
105
362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960).
106
Id. at 60.
99
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to all handbills, not just fraudulent bills.107 The Court in Talley
found the ordinance to be unconstitutional on its face.108
Talley’s two-pronged support for anonymity is founded on an
understanding of the First Amendment as protecting democratic
self-governance.109 The Talley Court structured its argument
around the example of anonymous political pamphleteering.110
The Court reasoned that (1) banning anonymity interferes with a
First Amendment freedom of distribution,111 and (2) laws that deter
discussion by creating a fear of reprisal violate the First
Amendment.112
The Talley understanding of the First
Amendment’s protection of anonymity is founded on the example
of anonymous individuals criticizing the more powerful
government; those individuals distribute information, and are
deterred by fears of reprisal. Talley followed on NAACP by
building on the connection between freedom of association and
anonymity to find that laws that give rise to a fear of reprisal based
on identification, either as part of a group or as an individual,
should not be permitted.
By contrast, the Court in the 1995 decision McIntyre v. Ohio
departed in its reasoning from both Talley and NAACP. The
McIntyre Court based its protection for anonymous speech on a
literary rather than political understanding of the First
Amendment.113 The McIntyre Court conceived of anonymity as an
editorial choice.114 Anonymity is a means of expressing oneself,
and an author has the freedom to decide whether or not to disclose
107

Id. at 64.
Id. at 65.
109
See Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2353, 2362–63 (2000) (explaining that the purpose of the
First Amendment is to “preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas” and to function as
the “guardian of our democracy,” which both are supported by the theory of selfgovernment).
110
See Talley, 362 U.S. at 537.
111
Lovell v. City of Griffin, Ga., 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
112
See Talley, 362 U.S. at 537, 538.
113
See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (1995) (Stevens, J.)
(holding that Ohio’s statutory prohibition against distribution of any anonymous
campaign literature is a law “abridging the freedom of speech” within the meaning of the
First Amendment).
114
Id. at 341, 372
108
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his or her true identity.115 An author may choose to be anonymous
because of fear of retaliation, concern about social ostracism, or a
desire to protect his or her privacy; the Court implied that the
precise reason does not in fact matter.116 The Court found that “an
author’s decision to remain anonymous, like other decisions
concerning omissions or additions to the content of a publication,
is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First
Amendment.”117
In McIntyre, the Court had the option of addressing anonymity
solely as an extension of political speech. It did not.118 The Court
found that requiring an author to identify herself “is a direct
regulation of the content of speech.”119 The description of
anonymity as an editorial choice allowed the Court to characterize
a ban on anonymity as compelled speech.120 Requiring an author
to disclose his or her name was compelled speech, which is
unconstitutional absent a compelling state interest.
Only at the end of the opinion did the Court in McIntyre return
to the core of the Talley argument, that anonymity allows
democratic participation by protecting the unpopular individual
against the populace at large.121 “Anonymity is a shield from the
tyranny of the majority.”122 And anonymity exemplifies the
purpose of the First Amendment: “to protect unpopular individuals
from retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—at the hand of
an intolerant society.”123
The Court suggested in McIntyre that a legitimate state interest
could give rise to legitimate regulation of anonymity.124 For
example, the state has an interest in preventing fraud and libel, so
115

Id. at 342.
Id. at 341–42.
117
Id. at 342.
118
See Lee Tien, Who’s Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75
OR. L. REV. 117, 128–31 (1996).
119
McIntyre, 513 U.S. at 345.
120
Id. at 349, 379.
121
See id. at 357.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 353 (“[A] State’s enforcement interest might justify a more limited
identification requirement.”).
116
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anonymous speech might be less protected in those contexts.125
But because Ohio also had a narrower prohibition on false
statements made during political campaigns, the identity disclosure
requirement in McIntyre was found overbroad.126 The Court
explained that the state “cannot seek to punish fraud indirectly by
indiscriminately outlawing a category of speech, based on its
content, with no necessary relationship to the danger sought to be
prevented.”127
In 2002, the Supreme Court again addressed anonymous
speech in Watchtower Bible v. Village of Stratton.128 The Village
of Stratton required individuals engaging in door-to-door advocacy
to first register with the mayor and receive a permit.129 Registrants
were required to list their name and home address, and permits
were routinely granted, though could be denied for incomplete
information or for fraud.130 The Jehovah’s Witnesses brought the
case without having applied for a permit, explaining that such an
application would violate their First Amendment rights.131
The Court in Watchtower Bible explicitly acknowledged
McIntyre as having recognized “the right to distribute pamphlets
anonymously.”132 The Court also referred to a broader category of
protection: the “protection accorded to anonymous pamphleteering
or discourse.”133 This protection is not absolute, “particularly
when the solicitation of money is involved.”134 Thus, the Court
must strike a balance between legitimate government interests and
the effect of the regulations on First Amendment rights.135

125
See id. at 344, 349 (citing a California ordinance, which deals with false advertising,
and an Ohio statute, which deals with false statements made in reference to political
campaigns, as instances where state interest in preventing fraud and libel may override
anonymous free speech).
126
See id. at 351.
127
Id. at 357.
128
See Watchtower Bible v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 153 (2002).
129
See id. at 154–55.
130
See id. at 155 n.4.
131
See id. at 157–58.
132
Id. at 159
133
Id. at 160.
134
Id. at 162.
135
Id. at 163.
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The Court did not engage in lengthy analysis of why or how
the First Amendment protects anonymity. It instead used the fact
that there are a “significant number of persons who support causes
anonymously” in support of its finding that the ordinance was
overly broad.136
The Court found that the excessive breadth of the ordinance
raised serious constitutional concerns, despite the legitimacy of the
Village’s articulated interests.137 The Village argued that the
ordinance served three interests: “the prevention of fraud, [the
prevention of] crime, and the protection of privacy.”138 The Court
recognized these as important interests.139 Later in the opinion, the
Court recognized additional state interests in protecting the
integrity of a ballot-initiative process, and preventing fraudulent
commercial transactions.140 The Court held, however, that the
Village failed to strike an appropriate balance between the amount
of speech covered by the ordinance and the government interests it
purported to serve, and that the ordinance was not adequately
tailored to the Village’s stated interests.141 The Court stated that
the overbreadth alone did not render the ordinance invalid, but the
lack of tailoring in combination with the overbreadth did.142 It did
not matter whether the anonymous speech itself was of high or low
value, since the regulation was both overbroad and inadequately
tailored to state interests.143
The Court warned in Watchtower against using registration
requirements as a work-around for speech regulations.144 If a
particular kind of speech itself cannot be made a crime, then
136

Id. at 166.
See id. at 165–66.
138
Id. at 164–65.
139
Id. at 165.
140
See id. at 167.
141
See id. at 168.
142
See id.
143
In reviewing past cases, the Court observed that religious pamphleteering in
particular has been recognized as high-value speech with a claim to freedom of speech
and freedom of the press. See id. at 161. The Court did not suggest, however, that lower
value speech would not be protected; the high value of the speech was not the deciding
factor—the overbreadth and lack of tailoring of the ordinance were the key features in the
decision. Id. at 168.
144
See id. at 164.
137
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governments may not work around that restriction by punishing
speech solely because one has failed to register in advance of
speaking.145 The Court found that the registration requirement
imposes “an objective burden” on citizens, and bans “a significant
amount spontaneous speech.”146 Quoting Thomas v. Collins, the
Court noted that “[a]s a matter of principle a requirement of
registration in order to make a public speech would seem generally
incompatible with an exercise of the rights of free speech and free
assembly.”147
The Court in Watchtower adds that it is
“offensive . . . to the very notion of a free society—that in the
context of everyday public discourse a citizen must first inform the
government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain
a permit to do so.”148 Registration of identity operates like a prior
restraint, preventing speaking unless a license has been obtained or
a tax paid.149
The most interesting suggestion in Watchtower is the Court’s
acknowledgment that anonymity may be contextual rather than
absolute. Even though the door-to-door petitioners would be
revealing their faces to individuals, they still “maintain their
anonymity” because their faces but not their identities are
revealed.150 This conclusion treats anonymity as a communicative
tool employed by speakers within the context of a relationship. In
the anti-mask context, this recognizes that anonymity is a selective
disguise directed towards an audience, and does not require perfect
obfuscation for First Amendment protection to be afforded.
Similarly, the online context does not require perfect anonymity
for First Amendment protection to be afforded to a speaker—it
requires contextual anonymity.151
145

See id.
Id. at 167.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 165–66.
149
Id. at 167–68 (finding that “the regulation is analogous to the circulation licensing
tax the Court invalidated in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)”).
150
Watchtower Bible v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 167 (2002) (“The fact that
circulators revealed their physical identities did not foreclose our consideration of the
circulators interest in maintaining their anonymity.”).
151
See HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT 3 (2010) (describing privacy as
“context-relative informational norms”).
146

C02_KAMINSKI (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

REAL MASKS AND REAL NAME POLICIES

4/17/2013 2:41 PM

839

The most recent Supreme Court case on anonymity is the
Court’s 2010 decision in Doe v. Reed.152 Reed addresses the
tension between disclosure and privacy in the context of electoral
law.153 Washington State allows its voters to circulate and sign
referendum petitions to challenge existing laws.154 Under state
law, if the referendum petition achieved a critical mass of
signatures, the referendum would be placed on the ballot, so the
signature also functions as a vote.155 Washington State’s Public
Records Act (PRA) made such referendum petitions publicly
available.156 Doe sought an injunction against such disclosure,
with respect to a petition against a state law extending benefits to
same-sex couples.157
The question before the Court was whether disclosure of
referendum petitions in general—rather than this particular
petition—violates the First Amendment, under a facial challenge to
the Public Records Act.158 The Court concluded that disclosure of
referendum petitions “does not as a general matter violate the First
Amendment,” although disclosure of this particular petition might,
in an as-applied challenge not yet brought before the Court.159
The “electoral context” was central to the Court’s decision in
Reed.160 Noting that states are allowed “significant flexibility in
implementing their own voting systems,” and observing that the
PRA is not a prohibition on speech but a disclosure requirement,
the Court chose “exacting scrutiny” as the appropriate standard of
review.161 Exacting scrutiny “requires a ‘substantial relation’
between the disclosure requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’
governmental interest.”162 The Court found a substantial relation

152

130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010).
Id. at 2824.
154
Id. at 2815.
155
See id. at 2817.
156
WASH. REV. CODE § 42.56.070(1) (2008).
157
Reed, 130 S. Ct. at 2813, 2816.
158
Id. at 2817.
159
Id. at 2822.
160
Id. at 2818.
161
Id.
162
Id. (quoting Citizens United v. Federal Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 914
(2010)).
153
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between a sufficiently important governmental interest—the
“State’s interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral
process”—and the disclosure requirement.163
Thus in Reed, under a less protective standard of review
imported from the electoral context, the Court recognized that state
interests can trump the anonymity right. In addition to or as
subparts of the state’s interest in the integrity of the electoral
process, the Court recognized the State’s “important interest” in
preventing
fraud,
and
promoting
transparency
and
accountability.164 It refused to reach the State’s more generally
asserted “informational interest.”165
The Court explained that the plaintiffs could have prevailed
under the First Amendment if they had shown “a reasonable
probability that the compelled disclosure . . . will subject them to
threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials
or private parties.”166 The plaintiffs, however, failed to show
specific harm caused by referendum petitions in general, which
they would have to do in order to win a facial challenge. Instead,
they focused on harm related to the specific petition at issue.167
Thus, the Court explained that while the plaintiffs had failed at the
broad facial challenge, this did not foreclose the possibility of
success in a narrower challenge.168
The centrality of the election context in Reed cannot be
overemphasized.
In the majority opinion, Justice Roberts
distinguished between the majority’s application of exacting
scrutiny and Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion by pointing out
that Justice Thomas had chosen to employ strict scrutiny.169 The

163

Id. at 2819. In greater detail, this interest was described as an interest in “preserving
the integrity of the electoral process by combating fraud, detecting invalid signatures, and
fostering government transparency and accountability.” Id.
164
Id.
165
Id.
166
Id. (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 74 (1976)).
167
Id. at 2821.
168
Id.
169
Id. at 2820, n.2 (Roberts, C.J.) (stating that “Justice Thomas’s contrary assessment
of the relationship between the disclosure of referendum petitions generally and the
State’s interests in this case is based on his determination that strict scrutiny applies
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lower standard of exacting scrutiny applies in the electoral context
because of the required deference to states in implementing their
voting systems, and the importance of disclosure specifically in
this context.170
One observation in Reed is of particular interest. The majority
found that signing a petition is fully protected speech, even though
it is also a “legally operative legislative act.”171 This is relevant for
online anonymity because online anonymity both serves as an
“operative act” of concealing identity, and is at a very basic level
speech. There remains a question of whether an automaticallygenerated “Anonymous” handle would be considered speech by
the speaker. Arguably, if the person at some point chose not to
enter a handle, that would be equivalent to typing “Anonymous” as
the handle, and therefore would be operative speech under Reed.
Finally, the concurrences in Reed show some interesting
turmoil around McIntyre. Justice Scalia clearly still believes that
McIntyre was wrongly decided,172 but acknowledges that the case
recognized a “right to ‘speak’ anonymously.”173 Justice Stevens,
with Justice Breyer, believes that McIntyre did not create a special
separate right to speak anonymously—it dealt with a specific
burden on the more general right to speak.174 This split will likely
arise again in the next Supreme Court case on anonymity.
Although it is not a case about anonymity per se, the recent
Supreme Court case of U.S. v. Alvarez has significant implications
for pseudonymous and anonymous speech.175 In Alvarez, the
Court was asked to recognize false speech as an exception to the
First Amendment.176 Alvarez had lied about having received a
Medal of Honor; this lying was penalized under the Stolen Valor
Act.177 The Court found that false speech is not one of the
rather than the standard of review that we have concluded is appropriate”) (citation
omitted).
170
See id. at 2818.
171
Id.
172
Id. at 2831 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring).
173
Id. at 2832 (Scalia, J., concurring).
174
Id. at 2831 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring).
175
See 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012).
176
Id. at 2539–40.
177
Id. at 2539 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 704(b) and (c) (2006)).
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recognized historical exceptions to the First Amendment, and
therefore lying is protected by the First Amendment.178 Specific
sub-types of false speech, such as fraud and defamation, are
exceptions to the First Amendment because they create a “legally
cognizable harm.”179 False statements to courts or Government
officials, or impersonating an officer, are exceptions to the First
Amendment because they concern the “integrity of Government
processes.”180
If Alvarez had been decided differently, and held that false
speech is an exception to the First Amendment, then anonymity
and especially pseudonymity might be regulable as false
statements about one’s identity. This would have placed Alvarez
in direct conflict with McIntyre. Instead, Alvarez indicates that the
current Court is extremely speech-protective, and disinclined to
create new exceptions to the First Amendment.181 Writing under a
pseudonym will presumably be protected under Alvarez, because
lying about one’s identity should be no less protected than any
other kind of lie, barring an exceptional state interest.
Thus the question that remains is not whether anonymity is
protected, but how much protection it receives, and how to handle
anonymity that also serves a noncommunicative function. If
anonymity is used to defame somebody, or is part of speech that is
“integral to criminal conduct,” or is used to propagate obscenity, it
will presumably at some point lose First Amendment protection.182
Then there remains a question—debated in the Stevens and Scalia
concurrences in Reed—of whether there is a right to anonymous
speech, or protection for anonymity as a corollary of the right to
speak more generally.183 McIntyre suggests that all anonymitythrough-speaking is an editorial choice and thus protected as
speech, but Talley suggests that anonymity is based on freedom of
distribution, and freedom of association.

178
179
180
181
182
183

Id.
See id.
Id. at 2546.
See id. at 2545–46.
See id. at 2539 (listing categories of unprotected speech).
See id. at 2831 n.4 (describing both Justices’ interpretations).
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B. Open Questions
Commentators appear to agree that First Amendment
protection for anonymity is not absolute.184 From this point,
however, scholars vary significantly both in how strong they
understand First Amendment protection for anonymity to be, and
which Supreme Court cases they identify as the foundation of
anonymity analysis. The points of consensus and differentiation
center on the following discussions: (1) whether the First
Amendment protects only core political speech; (2) whether broad
disclosure requirements are constitutional; (3) what kinds of
compelling state interests might overcome First Amendment
protection; (4) whether election law cases are exceptions to or
illustrative of the balancing rule; and (5) how much of a showing
of retaliation, if any, is necessary to establish the First Amendment
right. Finally, there is an open question about untraceability: has
the Court ever considered the harm to law enforcement that arises
from complete untraceability?
The majority of commentators focus their analysis on Talley,
McIntyre, and Watchtower Bible as the sources of a First
Amendment anonymity right. The primary question appears to be
how broadly the right to anonymous speech extends from political
speech to other kinds of speech.185 Anonymous political speech is
clearly protected. Are other kinds of anonymous speech equally
deserving of First Amendment protection?
This focus on the speech’s value might stem from an
agreement among commentators that the anonymity right is not

184

See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, The Privacy Privilege: Law Enforcement, Technology,
and the Constitution, 7 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 1 (2002) (“The First Amendment protects
the privacy of certain acts.”) (emphasis added); Ekstrand, supra note 37, at 407 (“The
protections for anonymous speech are not absolute.”); Choi, supra note 5, at 520
(“[A]dvocates consistently refer to anonymity as a fundamental human right, regardless
of how limited or uncertain it may be.”); Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1537–38
(“[T]he First Amendment, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, confers
upon authors a right to speak anonymously or pseudonymously . . . . But this right to
speak anonymously is not absolute.”).
185
See, e.g., Ekstrand, supra note 37, at 413 (“While many commentators agreed that
the kind of anonymous political speech published by Mrs. McIntyre deserved the highest
level of First Amendment protection, they expressed concern about whether McIntyre
protected other kinds of speech and under what circumstances it should.”).
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absolute.186 They thus perceive a need for a balancing test between
the value of the anonymous speech and state interests. The
balancing test view of protection for anonymity weighs the quality
of the speech being protected against the nature of the state interest
being propagated.
The first point of division between
commentators is whether the speech must be “core” First
Amendment speech to be protected.187 This leaves open the
question of whether nonpolitical anonymous speech is protected by
the First Amendment.
The other half of the balancing equation concerns what
constitutes a sufficiently compelling state interest. Again, several
commentators point to the regulation of fraud, false advertising,
and libel as sufficient state interests for the regulation of
anonymous speech, if a statute is adequately tailored to those
interests.188 Analogously, associational privacy could be overcome
by the state interest in forbidding discrimination in places of public
accommodation.189 Earlier cases on anonymity leave open the
possibility that obscenity, commercial solicitation, and the
advocacy of unlawful conduct might be exceptions as well.190
The state interest alone is not enough, however; others point
out that the regulation must be narrowly tailored to it.191 Thus
commentators disagree over whether a compelling state interest
might allow regulation of all anonymous speech, in the form of
imposing real-name policies, or whether real-name policies are not
viable because they will never be narrowly tailored.
186

See, e.g., Froomkin, Anonymity and its Enmities, supra note 1, at ¶ 58
(“Nevertheless, the right to privacy in one’s political associations and beliefs can be
overcome by a compelling state interest.”).
187
Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 427 (“Doctrinal discussions of
permissible restrictions on the freedom of speech commonly divide the discussion into
‘political’ and ‘non-political’ speech, and the sketch which follows adopts this
convention.”); Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1541 (“Laws requiring disclosure in the
context of political speech, on the other hand, should be (if anything) even more difficult
to justify; in the context of commercial speech, however, the assumption of a rational,
critical audience may give way to more paternalistic assumptions and thus make it
relatively easy for the state to compel disclosure.”).
188
See, e.g., Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960).
189
See Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 429.
190
See Choi, supra note 5, at 537.
191
See, e.g., Ekstrand, supra note 37, at 411.
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The biggest challenge pro-anonymity commentators appear to
face in anonymity case law is the body of election law cases.192
Some distinguish these cases as specific to the electoral context,
arguing that there is a long American tradition of anonymous
speech, but an equally compelling tradition of transparency in
political proceedings.193 I agree that the election law cases are
distinguishable.
This brings us to a final question regarding existing case law:
whether an anonymous speaker must make a showing of retaliation
in order to prevail, or if a court may conclude without evidence
that a chilling effect may occur. This is actually a broader question
about First Amendment chilling effects doctrine, which, while
often cited, is woefully underexplored.194 Froomkin, for example,
recognizes that when dissidents demonstrate a credible fear of
retaliation for what they say, they are usually protected.195 In
NAACP, the Court pointed out that the NAACP made a strong
concrete showing that its members would experience retaliation.
In Doe v. Reed, the Court explained that the facial challenge failed
because the Does had failed to make a showing of retaliation for all
disclosures. In both Talley and McIntyre, however, the Court did
not appear to ask for a showing of retaliation.
As for untraceability, the Supreme Court has never engaged in
discussion of how traceable and untraceable anonymity differ. The
state arguably has a stronger interest in preventing untraceable
anonymity, because completely untraceable anonymity precludes
law enforcement.196 There are two possible explanations for the
Court’s failure to consider the spectrum of traceability. First, there
may have been no difference between traceable and untraceable
anonymity in the days before good forensics; all anonymity might
have been functionally untraceable, or too costly to trace absent a
192

See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 586 F.3d 671 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. John Doe No. 1
v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (holding that, in general, the disclosure of referendum
petitions does not violate First Amendment speech protection).
193
Boudin, supra note 45, at 2164.
194
Lidsky, Silencing John Doe, supra note 36, at 888 n.169.
195
Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 429 (noting that the Supreme Court
tends to be “highly solicitous of the need of dissidents and others to speak anonymously
when they have a credible fear of retaliation for what they say”).
196
See Choi, supra note 5, at 526–28.
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witness. Conversely, the Court may never have had to consider
truly untraceable anonymity because each of its subjects—Talley
and McIntyre—had in fact been traced. First Amendment
anonymity served in those cases to provide a curtain of additional
obscurity, not to prevent law enforcement from finding identity if
necessary through other means.197
However, the Court in Watchtower specifically addressed a
blanket ban against untraceable (or less traceable) anonymity.198
The Village required canvassers to register with the government
prior to engaging in door-to-door advocacy, and to provide a list of
which homes would be visited.199 Presumably, if anything
occurred during canvassing, the government could easily trace the
perpetrator through the list of names and locations. The Court did
not state that this type of registration requirement is always
unconstitutional, but required legitimate state interests and
tailoring to those interests before such a registration requirement
could be constitutional.200
General registration burdens an
enormous amount of speech, untailored to a state interest, and all
spontaneous speech would be presumptively illegal.201
III. ANTI-MASK LAWS AND CASES
In light of the open questions left by Supreme Court doctrine
on anonymity, anti-mask laws and case law illuminate a great deal
about the scope of legal protection for anonymity. The cases show
both how courts treat anonymity in the real world, and how courts
might treat blanket real-name policies online.
Anti-mask case law displays courts struggling with
fundamental questions about anonymity, including the question of
when anonymity implicates First Amendment rights. Some courts
treat mask-enabled anonymity as conduct rather than speech; some
look to the content of the masks to determine if the mask-wearing
197
Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CAL.
L. REV. 1 (2013).
198
See Watchtower Bible v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
199
Id. at 155.
200
See id. at 168.
201
Id. at 167.
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is expressive; others observe that anonymity is inherently entwined
with expression and freedom of association. Courts, like Doe
scholars, also differ as to their underlying intuitions about
anonymity’s nature. Some courts assume that anonymity is
inherently threatening; others assume that it is fundamentally
important to a free society.
This section additionally observes that there is a circuit split
developing in anti-mask case law. Previous scholars have
characterized this split as evidence of legal realism at work—“the
KKK loses, but Iranian students win.”202 The situation is both
more nuanced and more interesting.
This Part opens with an overview of the different kinds of antimask statutes. Some statues are broader than others, and thus more
strongly implicate freedom of expression. It then turns to the case
law in an effort to distinguish between those cases that uphold antimask statutes and those that find them problematic. Courts vary in
their treatment of the nexus between anonymity and expression,
their treatment of mask-wearing as symbolic speech, and their
intuitions about anonymity itself.
As a consequence of these variations, different courts have
imposed different burdens on defendants and on the state. In some
cases, courts require defendants to show evidence of past
retaliation in order to find a nexus between anonymity and
expression; in others, they do not. In some cases, courts require
the state to show evidence of a link between anonymity and the
state interest in preventing crime; in others, they do not. A
common holding, even among a number of the cases upholding
anti-mask statutes, is that anti-mask statutes as written are often
too broad. This has significant implications for proposed online
real-name policies.

202

See A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, The
Clipperchip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 822 n.478 (1995) (addressing
the “mixed reception” of strict liability antimask statutes very briefly) [hereinafter
Froomkin, The Clipperchip].
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A. Anti-Mask Statutes
Many states have passed anti-mask statutes, but states vary
widely in what behavior they criminalize. Other scholars have
noted some of the variations, but none appear to have outlined the
complete spectrum.203 This article finds that anti-mask statutes are
more varied than previous scholarship suggests.
State anti-mask laws arose primarily in response to the actions
of the Ku Klux Klan.204 A number of anti-mask laws were
therefore enacted in the early 1950s.205 However, an early 1845
New York anti-mask law arose out of demonstrations and riots by
anti-rent protestors disguised as Indians.206
Many states criminalize all mask-wearing in public.207 This
type of statute is typically subject to a list of exceptions for
customary uses of masks, such as mask-wearing on Halloween or
en route to masquerades. Within this category of statute, states
differ as to which exceptions are permitted. But this type of statute
functionally creates a strict liability crime: if you wear a mask in
public, you violate the statute.
Several states, by contrast, penalize mask-wearing when the
wearer’s intent is to conceal identity.208 Rather than creating a
strict liability crime, this requires an additional showing of intent

203

See Wayne R. Allen, Klan, Cloth and Constitution: Anti-Mask Laws and the First
Amendment, 25 GA. L. REV. 819, 821 (1991) (describing two types of statutes: a general
anti-mask statute, and a statute that criminalizes mask-wearing with the intent to deprive
somebody of their civil rights); Stephen J. Simoni, Note, Who Goes There?—Proposing a
Model Anti-Mask Act, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 241, 242 (1992) (describing two types of
statutes: a general statute, and a statute that criminalizes wearing a mask with the intent to
commit a crime); Evan Darwin Winet, Face-Veil Bans and Anti-Mask Laws: State
Interests and the Right to Cover the Face, 35 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 217, 231–
33 (2012) (employing the same two classifications as Simoni).
204
Allen, supra note 203, at 827.
205
See Jeanine Bell, Policing Hatred: Police Bias Units and the Construction of Hate
Crime, 2 MICH. J. RACE & L. 421, 430–31 (1997); see, e.g., REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:313
(West 1986); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1301 (1981).
206
See People v. Aboaf, 187 Misc. 2d 173, 183, 721 N.Y.S.2d 725, 733 (Crim. Ct.
2001) (discussing N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(4) (LexisNexis 2012)).
207
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.735 (West 1987) (banning public mask-wearing
except if “incidental to amusement or entertainment”).
208
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 185 (LexisNexis 2012) (criminalizing wearing a mask
in public places with the intent to conceal identity).
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by the state. Functionally, however, it can allow for the arrest of
anybody wearing a mask, and the showing of intent might not be
particularly difficult given that most masks obscure identity.
A third category of statutes bolsters the intent requirement,
criminalizing wearing a mask for the purpose of depriving another
person of civil rights. The federal anti-mask law exemplifies this
type of statute; the federal law allowed for federal prosecution of
the KKK when they attempted to interfere with individuals’ right
to vote.209
Connecticut has created a fourth type of statute, which
penalizes wearing a mask with the intent to subject somebody to
rights deprivation while in fact violating a separate provision on
rights deprivation.210 This hybrid statute requires both intent
(wearing the mask with the intent to perform rights deprivation)
and action (actually depriving somebody of their rights).211
The fifth type of anti-mask statute requires more than intent to
conceal one’s identity, and arguably more than intent to violate
somebody’s rights, but less than action; it criminalizes wearing a
mask for the purpose of committing a crime.212 This changes the
crime from being wearing a mask, per se, to using a mask with the
intent that it serve as a criminal tool.213
The sixth type of statute criminalizes wearing a mask during
the actual commission of a crime.214 This varies from the fifth
type of statute. The fifth type would allow arrest of a mask-wearer
before a crime, but requires a showing of intent to commit a crime.
The sixth requires the actual commission of a crime, but not
necessarily the intent to use the mask as a tool.215
209

See United States v. Original Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 250 F. Supp. 330, 349
(D.C. La. 1965) (holding that “the Civil Rights Act of 1957 applies to . . . interfering with
the right to register as well as interfering with the right to vote”).
210
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-37(a) (2011) (criminalizing the deprivation of a person’s
civil rights by a person is wearing a hood, mask, or other device designed to conceal their
identity).
211
Id.
212
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:313 (1986) (criminalizing mask-wearing with
the intent to conceal identity).
213
See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-2(c)(4) (2012).
214
Id.
215
Compare id., with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:313 (West 1986).
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The variation in anti-mask statutes suggests that legislatures,
like courts, struggle with determining when anonymity is
functional and when it is expressive. Some statutes assume that all
mask-wearing is fundamentally functional in nature. All maskwearing can thus be banned, unless the wearer adds some
additional expressive element, such as religious significance.
On the other end of the spectrum, however, some states
criminalize mask-wearing only when the mask has been used in the
commission of a crime, suggesting that anonymity is understood to
have social value, until it becomes clearly functionally harmful.
When used in the commission of a crime, anonymity becomes
primarily functional in nature, and the statute interest in preventing
harm overrides any expressive interest in the mask.
Between these two poles, some states ban mask-wearing only
when the wearer intends for the mask to serve an identityconcealing function, or to aid in the commission of another
offense. The civil rights-related anti-mask laws fall into this
middle category. The mask need not actually be used as a criminal
tool, but the burden of showing intent rests with the state, not the
wearer.
B. Anti-Mask Case Law
Most of the anti-mask statutes challenged in court have been
the first type of statute, which establishes general liability for
mask-wearing in public, subject to a list of exceptions.216 This
indicates that where masking is clearly done in service of a
nefarious purpose, petitioners deem it unlikely that a court will
strike down the statute. A number of courts have found general
anti-mask statutes unconstitutionally overbroad, recognizing that
they cover an impermissible amount of expressive conduct.
However, a number of courts have also upheld the constitutionality
of general anti-mask laws.
The split appears to have arisen for the most part around the
question of when anonymity is conduct and when it is expressive.
Strangely, however, a few courts have found that anonymity is
expressive but still upheld the statutes. These courts conclude that
216

See Simoni, supra note 203, at 243–44.
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anonymity is a particularly bad kind of expression that states can
permissibly ban because it is frightening. After the Supreme
Court’s holding on true threats in Virginia v. Black, this line of
reasoning should no longer be considered good law.217
For our purposes, it is helpful to read these cases with an eye
towards what assumptions the court makes about the default nature
of anonymity. Is it conduct? Does it have a nexus with
expression, and if it does, what is the burden of proof as to that
nexus? If anonymity is expression, is it protected expression, or a
threat in and of itself? Courts have split widely on their answers to
these questions.
Where courts have struck down or limited anti-mask laws, it
has been for a number of reasons. Some find the laws overbroad,
and some find the laws too vague. Some find that masks are
symbolic speech, and the statute fails the O’Brien test. Some have
found that anonymity is conduct, but implicates freedom of speech
and association under NAACP and Talley. One recent case treated
anonymity as a First Amendment right in itself, under McIntyre.218
These cases show that despite a recent Second Circuit decision
upholding New York’s anti-mask law, there is a history of
jurisprudence recognizing a link between anonymity and free
expression in the context of anti-mask laws. Courts that have
upheld anti-mask statutes find that the statutes primarily regulate
conduct and not speech; that mask-wearing is not symbolic speech;
or, similarly, that there has been an insufficient showing of a nexus
between mask-wearing and freedom of association.
1. The Earliest Cases
The earliest anti-mask cases came down long before the
Supreme Court began considering a First Amendment right to
anonymity in the 1960s. The earliest cases primarily concerned
the scope of anti-mask statutes, and what the statutes meant when
they criminalized individuals for being “masked” or “in disguise.”

217

See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362 (2003) (finding that a statute banning cross
burning with intent to intimidate violates the First Amendment).
218
Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d 835, 844 (N.D.
Ind. 1999).
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These cases understandably did not address the First Amendment,
but they are nonetheless helpful for understanding the purpose and
scope of anti-mask laws. Early cases limit the scope of anti-mask
laws, refusing to apply the laws to partial or unintentional
disguises. This shows that even early courts recognized the need
for limits on anti-mask laws. These cases also show that antimasks laws are, in the eye of courts, proxies for regulation of
anonymity rather than a bans on expressive disguise.
In the 1871 case Dale v. Gunter, the Supreme Court of
Alabama rejected charges filed against a person concealed in
bushes.
The man was charged with being a “person in
disguise.”219 The court explained that being in the bushes was a
position, while being in disguise entailed wearing a dress or mask
“intended to conceal the person who wears it.”220 What is
interesting about this interpretation is that it reads in an element of
intent: the wearer must intend to be concealed.221 Later courts and
other statutes do not always require intent to conceal.222
Several early challenges to anti-mask laws contended that the
laws were void for vagueness because they did not adequately
define the term “mask” or “disguised.” These cases address
whether being “disguised” covers partial disguises such as
makeup, or covers only complete anonymity. In Anderson v.
Texas, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas found that the term
“mask” was not too vague. However, the portion of the statute
criminalizing disguising oneself in a manner as to “render [the
offender’s] identification impossible, or more difficult” to identify
was too indefinitely framed.223 Two subsequent Texas cases
similarly upheld the term “mask” against a void-for-vagueness
challenge.224 A 1969 Texas case, Garcia v. Texas, clarified that
the anti-mask law applied only to disguises that made it impossible

219

Dale v. Gunter, 46 Ala. 118, *9 (Sup. Ct. Ala. 1871).
Id.
221
Id.
222
See infra Part III.A.3.
223
21 S.W.2d 499, 453 (Tex. Crim. App. 1929).
224
Dellinger v. State, 28 S.W.2d 537, 539 (Tex. Crim. App. 1930); see also Caldwell v.
State, 75 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex. Crim. App. 1934).
220
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to identify the defendant.225 Thus courts have equated masking
oneself with fully obscuring one’s identity, or making oneself
anonymous. These cases show that courts understood anti-mask
statutes to be prohibitions on anonymity, not prohibitions on
dressing up.
Even in these early cases, it is apparent that courts were aware
that anti-mask laws could be too broad. A 1912 New York court
reversed a conviction where a defendant was arrested in front of a
theater wearing makeup and women’s clothes and charged with
vagrancy for being “in disguise.”226 The court explained that “if
this conviction of this young man be allowed to stand, there is no
reason why the disguised circus ‘barker,’ the midway ‘ballyhoo,’
or even the masquerader at the ball could not be convicted of
vagrancy under this statute, each for having indulged in his own
particular antics; and such a conviction, although perhaps it might
be deemed righteous by many, would be going far beyond
anything conceived by the Legislature.”227
Although the O’Brien standard for symbolic speech had not yet
been established, this court appears to recognize the value in
expressive conduct. An anti-mask statute applied too broadly
would implicate a variety of expressive conduct that occurs in
everyday social life. Interestingly, this case does not restrict the
scope of the statute to a ban on anonymity; it recognizes that some
forms of anonymity, such as that enjoyed by masqueraders at the
ball, can be expressive, and thus would not appropriately be
covered by the anti-mask statute.
It is thus clear that early courts, even before the Supreme Court
connected anonymity to the First Amendment, perceived a line
between regulable and unregulable behavior affected by anti-mask
laws.228

225
226
227
228

443 S.W.2d 847, 848 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
People v. Luechini, 136 N.Y.S. 319, 320–21 (1912).
Id.
See id.
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2. Cases Finding Anti-Mask Laws Unconstitutional
A number of courts have subsequently found anti-mask laws
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Courts that find antimask statutes unconstitutional have done so for a variety of
reasons. Several cases focus on the nexus between anonymity and
freedom of expression and association. Several courts instead find
that the state has failed to show a significant state interest in
regulating anonymity, by failing to produce evidence of the
connection between anonymity and other criminal conduct. One
court found that the anti-mask statute targeted speech, not conduct,
and thus should be subject to strict scrutiny, which it failed.
Two courts in 1978 found anti-mask laws to be
unconstitutional under the First Amendment.229 Both cases
addressed masked protests by groups mobilizing against the Shah
of Iran.230 Both described anonymity not as a First Amendment
right in itself, but as essential to the exercise of First Amendment
rights under NAACP v. Alabama.231 The earlier case hinged on the
direct chilling effect on speech and the use of masks as symbolic
speech, while the latter case instead addressed the statute’s
overbreadth and vagueness.232
In Aryan v. Mackey, students claimed that a university
regulation that prevented them from protesting the Shah of Iran
while masked violated the First Amendment.233 The university had
granted a demonstration permit, but barred the students from
wearing masks while demonstrating.234
The students in Aryan made two First Amendment claims.235
The first was what the court called a “non-communicative claim”
about the function of anonymity: without the masks, the students
229

Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 94 (N.D. Tex.1978); Ghafari v. Mun. Ct. for the
S.F. Jud. Dist. of S.F., 87 Cal. App. 3d 255, 259 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
230
Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 91; Ghafari, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 258–59.
231
Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 92; Ghafari, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 261.
232
Compare Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 92 (finding an anti-mask statute unconstitutional
because it interfered with an individual’s ability to exercise their First Amendment
rights), with Ghafari, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 265 (finding an anti-mask statute
unconstitutional because it is “overbroad and vague”).
233
Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 91.
234
Id.
235
Id.
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claimed they feared reprisal and would be afraid to demonstrate.236
The second claim was that the masks themselves had “become
symbols of protests against the Shah’s regime.”237
The court recognized that the First Amendment “does not grant
the right to anonymity.”238 However, the court added, citing Talley
and NAACP, that “First Amendment questions arise . . . when there
is such a nexus between anonymity and speech that a bar on the
first is tantamount to a prohibition on the second.”239
The court did not require the students to prove that they would
in fact be persecuted. Instead, the court reasoned that it was
apparent under the circumstances that identifiable students would
withdraw from protected activity out of fear of consequences if
they were not afforded anonymity.240 The court therefore found
that mask-wearing “is so closely connected to the speech that a
loss of the activity results in a loss of the expression itself.”241 The
University failed to show that the regulation would further its
interest in preventing violence on campus, so the court found that
the regulation failed.
Concerning the second claim—that the masks were symbolic
speech—the Aryan court stated without examination that the masks
“have become a symbol of opposition to a regime which is of such
a character that its detractors believe they must disguise their
identity to protect themselves.”242 Then, as with the first claim, the
court pointed out that the University had failed to supply a single
concrete fact regarding the causal connection between the
regulation of masks and the prevention of potential violence.
Thus the Aryan court found that mask-wearing both had a
significant nexus with free expression as conduct, and was
symbolic speech. Because the state failed to show a concrete state
interest by linking mask-wearing to violence through evidence, the
regulation was found to be unconstitutional.
236
237
238
239
240
241
242

Id. at 90.
Id.
Id. at 92.
Id.
Id. (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)).
Id.
Id.
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A second 1978 case also granted First Amendment protection
to mask-wearing, finding that the anti-mask statute at issue was
overbroad.243 In Ghafari v. Municipal Court for San Francisco
Judicial District of San Francisco, which came down a few
months after Aryan in December 1978, the California Court of
Appeal considered the constitutionality of the California anti-mask
statute.244 Iranian nationals had been arrested for picketing with
leaflets placed between their glasses and faces.245 The California
statute is a general anti-mask statute prohibiting partially or
completely concealing one’s face with intent to conceal identity,
with a list of exceptions.246 It was originally enacted in 1923.247
The appellants contended that the anti-mask statute was
facially overbroad.248 They claimed that the statute prohibited
anonymity where freedom of speech, peaceful assembly, and free
association might be involved. This ban was not required by a
compelling state interest, nor implemented in the least restrictive
manner.
Like the court in Aryan, the court in Ghafari did not require the
appellants to show that identification would result in reprisals.249
Instead, the court recognized that appellants had alleged fear of
retaliatory measures and that they would not have participated in
the demonstrations if they had not been able to protect their
anonymity.250 The court found this allegation adequate, and

243

See Ghafari v. Mun. Ct. for S.F. Jud. Dist. of S.F., 87 Cal. App. 3d 255, 265 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1978) (holding a California anti-mask statute unconstitutional under the First
Amendment).
244
Id. at 258.
245
Id. at 258–59.
246
Id. at 259–60.
247
Id. at 260.
248
Id.
249
See generally id. (The Court in Ghafari struck down the state’s anti-mask statute as
unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. In doing so, the Court did not require appellants
to provide evidence that they had a fear of reprisals when choosing to engage in
anonymous protesting.); see also Aryan v. Mackey, 463 F. Supp. 90, 92 (N.D. Tex. 1978)
(where, instead of requiring petitioners to provide evidence of reprisals, the Court simply
accepted the general rule reached in NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958),
that to compel disclosure of one’s identity may dissuade persons from exercising their
freedom of speech for fear of reprisals).
250
Ghafari, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 259.
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recognized the potential for a chilling effect if masking were not
allowed. This chilling effect stemmed from the appellants’
perception, not from concrete proof of past or future reprisals in
Iran.
Like the court in Aryan, the court in Ghafari recognized that
even though the appellants did not assert an absolute right to
anonymity, “anonymity is essential to the exercise of constitutional
rights,” citing NAACP.251 The court found the anti-mask statute to
be overbroad, because it inhibited the exercise of free speech and
exposed speakers to retaliation.252
In part, the court came to this finding because of the existence
of a similar but narrower California law, which criminalized the
wearing a mask for the purpose of concealment or evading
discovery.253 The narrower provision served a legitimate law
enforcement function.254 The court explained that “the wearing of
a mask per se does not affect adversely any legitimate state
interest,” so banning the wearing of a mask with no criminal
purpose served no legitimate law enforcement function and was
constitutionally overbroad.255 The Ghafari court also found that
the amusement and entertainment exceptions in the statute were
inherently vague, and violated the equal protection clause because
they favored amusement and entertainment over other protected
First Amendment expression.256 The court did not even reach the
question of whether the masks were symbolic speech.257
The Ghafari court thus focused on overbreadth and the nexus
between anonymity and free expression. It did not find it
necessary to determine whether masks were symbolic speech.
Anonymity itself could receive protection without embodying
additional expressive value through symbolism.
251
Id. at 260 (citing NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462); see also Aryan, 463 F. Supp. at 92
(explaining that while the First Amendment does not grant a right to anonymity,
constitutional questions nevertheless arise where there is a nexus between anonymity and
speech).
252
Ghafari, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 259, 262.
253
Id. at 261–62.
254
Id. at 262.
255
Id.
256
Id. at 265–66.
257
Id. at 266 n.5.
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A 1981 case similarly found the Florida anti-mask statute to be
overbroad, but not under the First Amendment.258 The Supreme
Court of Florida in Robinson v. State found that the Florida antimask statute deprived the appellant of due process because it was
overbroad.259 The Florida statute, which addressed all masks, with
exceptions, was found to be “susceptible of application to entirely
innocent activities . . . so as to create prohibitions that completely
lack any rational basis.”260 The court did not reach the First
Amendment arguments.
Two cases in the 1990s found anti-mask statutes
unconstitutional under the First Amendment. These cases focused
on mask-wearing as symbolic speech, rather than the nexus
between anonymity and free expression.
In 1990, a district court found a Tennessee city ordinance
banning masks to be unconstitutional under the First
Amendment.261 The City of Pulaski had passed an ordinance
banning masks in parades after the Ku Klux Klan initially
requested to parade downtown on Martin Luther King, Jr. Day.262
The district court found the ordinance unconstitutional. First, the
court found that the ordinance allowed too much latitude to
officials for denial of permits.263 Second, it found that particularly
in “the context of parades and demonstrations, certain masks and
disguises may constitute strong symbolic political expression that
is afforded protection by the First Amendment.”264 The ordinance
was thus constitutionally overbroad, because it could be used to
stifle symbolic expression.265 The court cited a Seventh Circuit
case in which the wearing of military uniforms in a parade had
been similarly found to be clear symbolic expression.266

258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266

Robinson v. State, 393 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. 1981).
Id.
Id. at 1077.
Ku Klux Klan v. MLK Worshippers, 735 F. Supp. 745, 751 (D.C. Tenn. 1990).
Id. at 747.
Id. at 749.
Id. at 751 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. (citing Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1200 (7th Cir. 1978)).
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In 1997, another court found mask-wearing to be symbolic
speech and thus protected by the First Amendment.267 A man wore
a ninja mask to a local government meeting in protest of the
Commission’s attempt to ban public participation in the meetings.
The mayor told him to take the mask off. Everybody knew the
man’s identity, and nobody appeared to be afraid of him. The
court found that the mask-wearing was symbolic speech, because
even though the man had not conveyed a very specific message,
the Supreme Court has never required symbolic speech to be very
particularized. The court also found that the government interest
was not strong: the trial court, supported by the record, found that
the mask-wearing was not disruptive of the meeting and did not
inspire fear. Because the city failed to establish a content-neutral
basis that served a substantial government interest for regulating
expressive conduct, exacting scrutiny was required and the
prohibition of the ninja mask was unconstitutional.
Perhaps the strongest First Amendment protection for maskwearing is found in American Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City
of Goshen.268 Rather than asking whether mask-wearing is
symbolic speech, or examining a nexus between anonymity and
free expression, the court in Goshen recognized a freestanding
right to anonymity established in McIntyre. That right was
violated by a city’s anti-mask ordinance.
The district court in Goshen addressed a city ordinance
prohibiting the wearing of a mask in a public place for the purpose
of disguising one’s identity.269 While recognizing that the KKK’s
white hood and mask carry special significance during religious
ceremonies and that the mask is “an essential part of their uniform
and organizational identity,” the court did not base its finding on
symbolic speech.270 Rather, the court held that the ordinance “by
prohibiting the wearing of masks for the purpose of concealing

267

Dayton v. Esrati, 707 N.E.2d 1140, 1144–47 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d 835 (N.D. Ind.
1999).
269
See id. at 836.
270
See id. at 837, 844.
268
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identity in public, burdens the free speech and association
rights.”271
The record before the court in Goshen showed “harassment,
threats of violence, job firings, and other retaliation” for
membership in the AKKKK.272 The city had also conceded that at
least some AKKKK members wore masks to conceal identity and
retain anonymity.273 Thus, the court found that under NAACP,
Buckley v. Valeo, Talley, and McIntyre, there could be no doubt
that the anti-mask statute would, as in Talley “tend to restrict
freedom to distribute information and thereby freedom of
expression.”274
The Goshen court showed the obvious influence of McIntyre in
deciding that the anti-mask ordinance governed speech, not
conduct.275 The court made it clear that the anti-mask ordinance
was “not content neutral,” because prohibiting anonymity “is a
direct regulation of the content of speech or expression.”276
Applying the “exacting scrutiny” used by the Supreme Court in
McIntyre, the court found that the city’s ordinance was not
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.277 As in
Aryan, the court in Goshen found that the government’s record did
not support a connection between the ordinance and the asserted
interest of preventing violence and apprehending criminals.278
One year after Goshen, another district court considered a
city’s anti-mask ordinance and found it unconstitutional, but
without declaring that the anti-mask ordinance was a content-based

271

Id. at 840.
Id. at 838.
273
See id.
274
Id. at 840 (quoting Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1960)) (citing McIntyre
v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)).
275
See id. at 844.
276
Id. at 842.
277
Id.
278
See id. at 842; see also Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 93–94 (1978) (finding no
concrete facts that the demonstrators should have feared violence as the demonstration
was peaceful).
272
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regulation.279 The district court granted in part and denied in part
the Klan’s request for permanent injunctive relief.280 The city’s
ordinance imposed criminal penalties for concealing one’s identity
in a public place, when coupled with certain intent requirements.281
The court decided that the Klan’s hoods constituted a form of
protected symbolic speech.282 However, unlike the district court in
Goshen, this district court did not find that the city’s anti-mask
ordinance was content-based.283 The ordinance regulated conduct.
The court explained that the ordinance’s requirement of different
kinds of intent contemplated affirmative conduct of some kind, and
that affirmative conduct could itself be legitimately proscribed by
the government.284 Where the ordinance regulated mask-wearing
with the intent to avoid identification, no additional affirmative
conduct was required but the government could still regulate
because of its legitimate interest.285
However, the court took issue with the section of the ordinance
that prohibited the wearing of a mask “with the intent to intimidate,
threaten, abuse or harass any other person.”286 The court found
this section problematic from a First Amendment perspective
because an individual could violate it “by engaging in protected
First Amendment activity while wearing a mask.”287 Thus, the
court found the ordinance overbroad on its face, and
unconstitutionally vague.288
In summary, courts finding anti-mask statutes problematic have
done so under a variety of justifications. Some focus on maskwearing as symbolic speech. Others focus on the nexus between
anonymity and freedom of expression. A number of courts find
the statutes facially overbroad or vague.
279

Church of the Am. Ku Klux Klan v. City of Erie, 99 F. Supp.2d 583 (W.D. Pa.
2000).
280
Id. at 585.
281
Id.
282
See id. at 587.
283
See id.
284
Id. at 589.
285
See id. at 591.
286
Id.
287
Id.
288
Id. at 592.
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Courts do not always require challengers to make a showing of
retaliation; they often infer from the circumstances that the
petitioners’ fear of retaliation is viable. Courts rejecting anti-mask
statutes often instead require the state to prove a connection
between anonymity and bad behavior, in order to show a
substantial government interest in regulating anonymity. Where
the state fails to make that showing, the statute is found
unconstitutional. Finally, one district court in Goshen found that
an anti-mask statute regulates content rather than conduct, and thus
merits strict scrutiny.
These cases show, apart from Goshen, that arguing over
McIntyre is almost beside the point. Courts have recognized First
Amendment values to anonymity long before McIntyre, and
continually refer to the anonymity protection established in Talley.
Anonymity can have a significant nexus with free expression,
freedom of association, and freedom of distribution; and the masks
themselves may be symbolic speech. Second, these courts do not
presume that anonymity is evil in and of itself. The state must
make a showing of an additional state interest beyond preventing
anonymity for the regulations to be constitutional. Third, courts do
not always require a showing of retaliation in order to find that
there might be a chilling effect.
3. Cases Upholding Anti-Mask Laws
The previous subsection showed that both state and federal
courts have overturned anti-mask laws and ordinances in
California, Florida, Texas, Tennessee, Indiana, and Ohio.289 An
equally significant number of courts have, however, upheld antimask statutes against constitutional challenges.
Most courts upholding anti-mask regulations begin with a
finding that the anti-mask statute regulates conduct, not speech.
Some find that the mask-wearing at issue is not symbolic speech
289
See Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d 835, 840
(N.D. Ind. 1999); Ku Klux Klan v. MLK Worshippers, 735 F. Supp. 745, 751 (M.D.
Tenn. 1990); Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 94 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Robinson v. State,
393 So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. 1981); Dayton v. Esrati, 707 N.E.2d 1140, 1144–47 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1997); Ghafari v. Mun. Ct. for the S.F. Jud. Dist. of S.F., 87 Cal. App. 3d 255,
259 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
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because it fails to convey a particularized message, or because
other portions of the costume can convey the same message
without a need for the mask.
Some of these cases recognize the possibility of a nexus
between anonymity and expression, independent of symbolic
speech, but explain that the defendants failed to show a viable fear
of retaliation and thus failed to establish that nexus. A few cases
note that anonymity is expressive but is inherently threatening and
thus the state interest in banning it is high. However, it is
important to note that even those cases that uphold anti-mask laws
often do so by narrowing the statutes’ scope.
Courts have upheld anti-mask statutes and ordinances in New
York, Georgia, the Seventh Circuit, and Virginia. The New York
case law is the most substantial, culminating in a recent Second
Circuit case.
The New York anti-mask law is a general anti-mask law,
banning the wearing of masks with exceptions for protected
conduct.290 It is one of the earliest anti-mask laws, and was
originally enacted in 1845 to address anti-rent protestors who
dressed as “Indians” while rioting. The protesters killed several
law enforcement officers who attempted to serve writs on them,
prompting legislation.291
The New York law bans being disguised, with exceptions,
including an exception for entertainment. Individuals who are
peacefully assembled for entertainment are permitted to obtain a
permit from the police to wear masks or disguise themselves in
public.292 In the 1967 case Schumann v. State of New York, the
district court refused to grant a temporary injunction against
enforcement of the New York anti-mask law, explaining that the
plaintiffs, a pantomime theater group protesting U.S. involvement
in war, had never actually applied for a permit exempting
themselves from the statute’s coverage.293

290
291
292
293

See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.45(4) (McKinney 2010).
People v. Aboaf, 721 N.Y.S.2d 725, 733 (N.Y. Crim. Ct 2001).
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.35(4) (McKinney 1989).
270 F. Supp. 730, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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In the 2001 case People v. Aboaf, a New York trial court found
that New York’s anti-mask law was constitutional, but subjected
the law to a limiting construction.294 The defendants in Aboaf were
self-described anarchists arrested while participating in a
demonstration in Union Square Park, wearing bandanas covering
their faces except for the eyes and forehead.295 The court first
stated that the New York anti-mask law clearly regulates conduct,
not speech.296 It then explained that to successfully make a First
Amendment challenge under freedom of association, the
defendants must show undisputed evidence that establishes “the
requisite nexus between compelled disclosure of the identities of
individuals and resulting recriminations.”297
Because the
defendants had failed to show evidence of a pattern of harassment
that would be mitigated through anonymity, the court found that
they could not link their anonymity to freedom of association. By
requiring the defendants to show a pattern of harassment, however,
the New York court departed from what other courts did earlier in
Aryan and Ghafari.
Despite finding that freedom of association had not been
implicated in this case, the court recognized that the New York
anti-mask statute might be overbroad. To avoid First Amendment
problems, the Aboaf court construed the law to prohibit the
wearing of masks when done “for no legitimate purpose.”298 The
court recognized that a mask can be worn “for communicative
purposes” (symbolic speech), and that anonymity can be “a
necessary corollary to freedom of association.”299 The court thus
recognized that mask-wearing could implicate the First
Amendment as symbolic speech, or when anonymity has a nexus
with free expression. To protect both of these types of expression,
the court limited the New York law to apply only to the wearing of
masks when not done for a legitimate purpose.
294

Aboaf, 721 N.Y.S.2d at 734 (holding that New York’s anti-mask statute was not
overbroad or unconstitutional as applied).
295
Id. at 727.
296
Id. at 728.
297
Id. at 729 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Hall-Tyner Election Campaign
Committee, 678 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1982)).
298
Id. at 733.
299
Id.
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Three years later, in the first anti-mask state law to reach a
Court of Appeals, the Second Circuit upheld New York’s antimask law in Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik.300 Ku Klux Klan members
applied for a parade permit, and were informed by the police
department that their plan to wear masks would violate New
York’s anti-mask law.301 The Second Circuit found that the maskwearing at issue was not symbolic speech.302 The Second Circuit
explained that here, the expressive force of the mask was
redundant with the costume.303 Because the mask had no
independent expressive value from the rest of the KKK uniform,
the mask was not symbolic speech.
In addition to this narrow holding, the Second Circuit
evidenced a broad limited interpretation of the First Amendment
right to anonymous speech.304 The court narrowly interpreted the
First Amendment right to anonymity established by the Supreme
Court in NAACP, Talley, and McIntyre as a right only against the
compelled disclosure of one’s name.305 The Second Circuit
explained that the Supreme Court “never held that freedom of
association or the right to engage in anonymous speech entails a
right to conceal one’s appearance in a public demonstration.”306 It
explicitly rejected the argument “that the First Amendment is
implicated every time a law makes someone—including a member
of a politically unpopular group—less willing to exercise his or her
free speech rights.”307

300
See Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 211 (2d
Cir. 2004).
301
Id. at 200.
302
See id. at 205.
303
See id. at 206, 208 (“[M]erely that where, as here, a statute banning conduct imposes
a burden on the wearing of an element of an expressive uniform, which element has no
independent or incremental expressive value, the First Amendment is not implicated, and
a balancing of interests under United States v. O’Brien . . . is unnecessary.”) (citing
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
304
See id. at 209.
305
See id. at 208 (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995);
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)).
306
Id. at 209.
307
Id.
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This second point reaches further than any cases before it.308 It
ignores the overbreadth and vagueness worries addressed by other
courts.309 And it ignores the “nexus between anonymity and
expression” observed in both Aryan and Ghafari.310 Limiting
Supreme Court case law to the disclosure of names rather than
identity also ignores the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Talley. In
Talley, the Supreme Court explicitly connected anonymity to the
First Amendment by explaining that public discussion could be
deterred through “identification and fear of reprisal.”311 Facial
recognition can be equivalent to compelling the disclosure of a
name; identification can often be made with a face as easily as
through a name, especially in an age of biometric scanning and
facial recognition software.
After Kerik, the New York Supreme Court considered the
appeal of eleven defendants from Aboaf in People v. Bull.312 The
court noted that Kerik controlled, so the “defendants’ constitutional
overbreadth and vagueness arguments” both failed.313 The court
also pointed out that the trial court’s ruling in Aboaf that limited
the New York statute to the wearing of masks “for no legitimate
purpose” had been overruled by Kerik.314
At the core of the Second Circuit decision in Kerik was its
strange conclusion that mask-wearing was not symbolic speech.315
The Second Circuit took its reasoning from a 1992 district court
case from the Eastern District of Virginia.316 This case, Hernandez
v. Superintendent, is important because it created the Kerik way of
analyzing whether mask-wearing is expressive conduct.

308

See id. (holding that “the plaintiffs’ right to anonymous speech is not implicated”).
See State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 673–74 (1990).
310
Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 92 (1978); see also Ghafari v. Mun. Ct. for S.F.
Jud. Dist. of S.F., 87 Cal. App. 3d 255, 260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978)
311
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).
312
People v. Bull, 784 N.Y.S.2d 270, 272 (Sup. Ct. NY 2004).
313
Id.
314
Id. (citing People v. Aboaf, 187 Misc. 2s 173 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct., 2001)) aff’d sub
nom. People v. Bull, 784 N.Y.S.2d 270).
315
Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 207 (2d
Cir. 2004) (citing Hernandez v. Superintendent, 800 F. Supp. 1344, 1351 (E.D. Va.
1992)).
316
Hernandez, 800 F. Supp. at 1353.
309
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Like the Second Circuit in Kerik, the Virginia district court
held in Hernandez v. Superintendent that mask-wearing by the Ku
Klux Klan was not expressive conduct.317 The court explained that
the burden rests on the petitioner to demonstrate that the conduct is
in fact symbolic speech, and here the petitioner failed.318 The
court found that the detachable mask was an optional part of the
Klan uniform; the petitioner’s companion was not wearing the
mask, and the petitioner could not articulate a particularized
message, saying only that the mask was “part of the symbolic
symbol of the Klan.”319 The court found that because the mask
contributed nothing to the message already conveyed by the rest of
the Klan costume, it did not convey a particularized message.320
This is a strange reading of the O’Brien test. A “particularized
message” does not mean a “nonredundant message.” For example,
if one wears a t-shirt with a picture of a peace sign, and a hat with
the same image, there is nothing in O’Brien to indicate that each
piece of clothing would not be separately protected by the First
Amendment. The Hernandez court and Kerik court strangely
appear to import the time, place, and manner test’s requirement
that regulation leave an alternative avenue for expression.321 The
Hernandez court reasoned that because the message in the Klan
mask could be expressed in an alternate method—through the rest
of the costume—the mask itself was not expressive conduct.322
This has never, however, been the standard for expressive conduct.
For First-Amendment-protected expression, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Cohen v. California makes it clear that the specific
means of communication is protected because the speaker’s choice
of medium itself is often expressive.323

317

Id. at 1351.
Id. at 1350.
319
Id.
320
Id. at 1351.
321
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (noting
that time, place and manner restrictions must be “content-neutral . . . [and] narrowly
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication”) (citations omitted).
322
Hernandez, 800 F. Supp. at 1351.
323
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
318
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Georgia courts took a different approach to upholding antimask laws. Instead of declaring that mask-wearing was not
symbolic speech, as did New York and Virginia, Georgia courts
found that mask-wearing can constitute expression unworthy of
First Amendment protection when it puts the viewer in a state of
legitimate fear. Thus Georgia courts have limited the general antimask statute to apply only when mask-wearing provokes “a
reasonable apprehension of intimidation, threats or violence.”324
The Supreme Court of Georgia in State v. Miller in 1990 found
that the Georgia anti-mask statute did not violate the First or
Fourteenth Amendments.325 The Georgia statute, established in
1951 after increased threats from the Ku Klux Klan,326 was a
general anti-mask statute with exceptions and no evident intent
requirement.327 Despite finding the statute constitutional, the court
narrowed it by reading in a requirement of intent to conceal one’s
identity and restricting the statute’s application to circumstances
where the mask-wearing provoked fear.
The court explained that while “under certain circumstances,
anonymity may be essential to the exercise of constitutional
rights,” anonymity has also been assumed for bad purposes.328
Thus, “[a]nonymity is neither an absolute social good, nor an
absolute constitutional right.”329
The court found the statute to be content-neutral because it
proscribed “a certain form of menacing conduct.”330 If Klan
members could show that they experienced reprisals when their
identities were revealed, they could show that the anti-mask law
impacted their freedom of expression. But the Klan here failed to
show proof of reprisals against its members.331

324

State v. Miller, 398 S.E. 2d 547, 552 (Ga. 1990).
Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 552–53.
326
Id. at 550.
327
Id. at 556 (Smith, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority opinion does not require
criminal intent for conviction under the Georgia anti-mask statute).
328
Id. at 552.
329
Id.
330
Id. at 551.
331
Id. (holding that “the record in this case is devoid of any proof of any injury to or
loss of a job by members of the Klan”).
325

C02_KAMINSKI (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

REAL MASKS AND REAL NAME POLICIES

4/17/2013 2:41 PM

869

The court did not base its decision, however, on the conclusion
that mask-wearing is not expressive conduct.332 Instead, it
“assume[d] without deciding that Miller’s wearing a mask was
conduct ‘sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to
implicate the First Amendment.’”333
But even under that
assumption, the state’s interest in anonymity’s functionality and
the negative nature of anonymity overrode any First Amendment
interest by the Klan. The court concluded that anonymity in
general is a bad thing, deserving of regulation by the state.334 “A
nameless, faceless figure strikes terror in the human heart. . .The
face betrays not only identity, but also human frailty.”335 Based on
this understanding of anonymity, the Miller court narrowed
Georgia’s general anti-mask statute into a new type of anti-mask
statute. The Georgia statute, after Miller, is directed specifically at
“intimidating or threatening mask-wearing behavior” with intent to
conceal identity.336
Since Miller, two things have happened to alter Georgia case
law. First, Georgia readdressed the statute in Daniels v. State in
1994, and further narrowed its construction.337 Second, the
Supreme Court came down with a more restrictive First
Amendment standard for regulating threats in Virginia v. Black in
2003 that impacts the viability of the Georgia interpretation.338
332

Id. at 549–50 (finding that the Anti-Mask Act statute was supported by a valid
government interest, the Court did not need to decide whether appellant’s mask-wearing
constituted symbolic speech).
333
Id. at 550 n.2 (quoting State v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2540 (1989)).
334
See id. at 552 (“[A]nonymity has often been assumed for the most pernicious
purposes. Anonymity is [not] an absolute social good.”); id. at 551 (“The state’s interests
furthered by the Anti-Mask Act lie at the very heart of the realm of legitimate
governmental activity.”).
335
Id. at 550.
336
See id. at 553.
337
Daniels v. State, 448 S.E.2d 185, 188–89 (Ga. 1994) (holding that conviction under
the Georgia anti-mask statute required not only intent to conceal one’s identity as
required by Miller, but additionally the intent to threaten, intimidate, or provoke the
apprehension of violence. This added requirement thus narrowed the scope of the
statute).
338
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (holding that, with regard to the First
Amendment, a state may permissibly regulate “statements where the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a
particular individual or group of individuals”).
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In the 1994 case Daniels v. State, the Supreme Court of
Georgia returned to the anti-mask statute addressed in Miller.339
Daniels, who lived on his Social Security income and collected and
recycled aluminum cans as a supplemental form of income, found
a discarded football helmet and green wrestling mask in the trash
and wore them to entertain neighborhood children playing in the
street.340 A police officer arrested Daniels because he witnessed
Daniels wearing the mask while addressing two young girls.341
Daniels argued that the state had failed to produce evidence
sufficient to convict, and the court agreed.342
The court returned to the Miller construction of the Georgia
anti-mask law, which required proof of intent to conceal identity,
and applied only to mask-wearing conduct that provokes a
reasonable apprehension of intimidation, threats, or violence.343
The court in Daniels restated Miller to criminalize mask-wearing
that the wearer knows provokes a reasonable apprehension of
intimidation, threats, or violence; or mask-wearing when the
wearer has been criminally negligent with respect to creating that
same fear. The court explained that the accused must (1) intend to
conceal his or her identity, and (2) either intend to threaten,
intimidate, or provoke the apprehension of violence, or be
criminally negligent of the same.344 Because all evidence pointed
to the fact that Daniels intended to entertain his subjects rather than
intimidate or threaten them, the state had produced insufficient
evidence to convict him under the statute.345
Presumably, Miller must also be affected by the Supreme
Court’s 2003 decision on cross-burning and true threats in Virginia
v. Black. The Supreme Court held that for regulation of a threat to
be constitutional, the threat must be a “true threat.”346 A true threat
consists of “a threat [directed] to a person or group of persons with
339

Daniels, 448 S.E.2d at 187.
Id. at 186.
341
Id.
342
Id. at 187.
343
Id. (quoting State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 552 (Ga. 1990)).
344
Id. at 189.
345
Id.
346
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.
705, 708 (1969) (per curiam)).
340
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the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or death.”347
Thus the “intimidating or threatening mask-wearing behavior”348
banned in Miller must be intended to make the threatened person
fear bodily harm or death.349 It is unlikely that much maskwearing causes people to fear bodily harm or death.
Nonetheless, this idea that there is a legitimate state interest in
banning anonymity because anonymity is inherently frightening
received traction in other courts as well. The Seventh Circuit
considered the constitutionality of an anti-mask rule in Ryan v.
County of DuPage.350 The defendant Ryan challenged a rule
against wearing masks in a local courthouse.351 Ryan had entered
the courthouse wearing an air filtration mask as an act of protest,
because bad air quality had previously resulted in closure of the
courthouse due to workers falling ill.352 The Seventh Circuit first
explained that “[t]he wearing of a mask inside a courthouse implies
intimidation.”353 Anonymity itself communicates a threat.354 Then
the Seventh Circuit pointed out that Ryan never explained a
particularized message attached to the mask; he had said that he
was wearing it for medical reasons.355
The Seventh Circuit in Ryan reviewed previous anti-mask
cases.356 It conceded that previous courts appeared divided over
whether prohibitions against being masked in a public place violate
the First Amendment.357 The Seventh Circuit explained, however,
that none of these cases suggested that prohibiting masks within a
courthouse was constitutionally questionable.358 In an attempt to
resolve the existing conflict, the court reasoned that the previous
cases that had found anti-mask statutes to be unconstitutional–

347
348
349
350
351
352
353
354
355
356
357
358

Id. at 360.
Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 553.
Black, 538 U.S. at 360.
45 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1091.
Id. at 1092.
Hernandez v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 669, 673 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
Ryan, 45 F.3d at 1093.
See id. at 1095.
Id.
Id. at 1096.

C02_KAMINSKI (DO NOT DELETE)

872

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

4/17/2013 2:41 PM

[Vol. 23:815

Ghafari and Aryan—involved individuals who feared violent
retaliation if they were not masked.359 Thus the Seventh Circuit
rejected Ryan’s claim for three reasons: the mask was not symbolic
speech, there was no proven nexus between anonymity and
freedom of association, and anonymity communicates intimidation
to viewers.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals also considered
anonymity’s inherently intimidating nature.360 In 1996, the court
concluded in State v. Berrill that the West Virginia anti-mask
statute had been constitutionally applied.361 West Virginia has a
general mask statute, with exceptions.362 To convince a board of
education to change the high school red devil mascot, Mr. Berill
attended a county board meeting dressed in a devil costume with a
mask.363 Witnesses from the meeting said they were frightened.364
The Berill court primarily followed the reasoning in Miller.365
It quoted Miller for the proposition that masking itself is inherently
frightening.366 It also pointed out that the focus of the statute is
conduct: the statute bans “the concealment of identity, and any
limitation on speech [was] merely a secondary effect.”367 The
court explained that Berrill had “alternate” means for “articulating
his concerns that would not have concealed his identity and thus
violated the statute.”368 Finally, the court pointed out that Berrill’s
message resulted in “chaos [rather] than understanding,” so it was
not a particularized message likely to be understood.369
Thus courts have upheld the constitutionality of anti-mask
statutes in New York, Virginia, West Virginia, Georgia; and the
Seventh Circuit found an anti-mask regulation in a courthouse to
be constitutional. These courts have upheld these anti-mask laws
359
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367
368
369

Id. at 1095.
See State v. Berrill, 474 S.E.2d 508 (W. Va. 1996).
See id. at 509.
See W. VA. CODE § 61-6-22 (1992).
See Berrill, 474 S.E.2d at 509.
See id. at 510.
See id. at 514–15.
See id.
Id. at 515.
Id.
Id. at 516.
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by finding that the statutes regulate conduct, not speech; that maskwearing is not sufficiently expressive; or that defendants fail to
show a nexus between anonymity and protected expression or
association. However, it is striking that a number of these cases do
attempt to limit the scope of the anti-mask statutes. Georgia
employed a narrowing interpretation, and a New York trial court
did so as well. The Second Circuit decision in Kerik may be the
most prominent anti-mask case, but it also appears to be an outlier
in its decision that the Supreme Court protection for anonymity is
limited to compelled disclosures of names.
4. Is Masking Inherently Bad? Other Cases on Intent
In a number of these cases, the question is raised of whether
being masked is by itself inherently bad, or whether a defendant
must have an additional intent to conceal herself or do some
additional bad thing. Even the difference in the types of state
statutes reflects this tension between different conceptions of
anonymity. As we saw in Miller and Daniels, Georgia courts have
read in several additional elements of intent.370 The district court
in City of Erie explained that intent must be illustrated by
conduct.371 By contrast, Hernandez, Ryan, and Kerik all described
mask-wearing as inherently threatening and not requiring
additional intent.372
Two additional cases about masks address intent in interesting
ways, though these cases do not address First Amendment claims.
In State v. Bryant, the Supreme Court of Tennessee struggled with
the state’s law dictating that masked entrance onto private property
shall be considered prima facie evidence of the accused’s intention
to commit a felony.373 The court held that the statute’s creation of
prima facie evidence was permissive only, not a mandatory
presumption.374 Permissive inference is unconstitutional as applied
370

See Daniels v. State, 448 S.E.2d 185, 188 (Ga. 1994); State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669,
673 (1990).
371
See Church of the Am. Ku Klux Klan v. City of Erie, 99 F. Supp.2d 583, 591 (W.D.
Pa. 2000).
372
See Kerik, 356 F.3d at 205–06; 45 F.3d 1090, 1092 (7th Cir. 1995); Hernandez v.
Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 669, 673 (Va. Ct. App. 1991).
373
State v. Bryant, 585 S.W.2d 586, 589 (Sup. Ct. Tenn. 1979).
374
See id.
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to a given defendant only if it is irrational for the juror to find the
presumed fact.375 So the statute was not unconstitutional on its
face; it was just a question of whether it was constitutional as
applied.376 The court then explained that the jury instructions must
make clear that the jury may, but need not, draw the inference
suggested by the statute.377 Since the jury instructions did not
make this clear, the court reversed and remanded.378 This holding
shows that a jury cannot be told that masked entrance onto a
property always means the accused intended to commit a felony;
the jury must be told that they are allowed but not required to make
that presumption about the accused’s intent.
A more recent Massachusetts case, Commonwealth v. Santos,
explained that intent to disguise oneself was a required element of
a Massachusetts statute in which wearing a mask is an aggravating
factor to the crime of armed or unarmed robbery.379 The court
considered whether evidence had been insufficient for a juror to
find that the defendant had been “masked” or “disguised.”380 The
defendant had been wearing a baseball hat and sunglasses, and a
band-aid on his face.381 The court found that the question should
not have been put to the jury, because what the defendant was
wearing did “not suggest or even remotely imply an intention or
conscious effort to conceal identity.”382
This case shows
consistency with earlier mask cases, in finding that one must
intend to be disguised to be convicted under anti-mask laws, and
shows that sometimes there is a burden on the state to establish that
intent.
C. Conclusions about Anti-Mask Cases
The case law on anti-mask laws teaches us a number of things
that we can bring into the context of online speech. First, courts
recognized First Amendment values in anonymity before McIntyre,
375
376
377
378
379
380
381
382

See id.
See id.
See id. at 589–90.
See id. at 590.
Commonwealth v. Santos, 672 N.E.2d 562, 564 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996).
See id.
See id.
Id. at 564.
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under Talley. Anonymity as a function can have a nexus with free
expression, and masks can be symbolic speech.
Second, it is not clear that courts always require an actual
showing of reprisals for anonymity to be considered to have a
substantial nexus with free expression. The 1978 cases of Aryan
and Ghafari did not require a showing of reprisals.383 They
allowed the courts to assume that the chilling effect would occur,
based on claims made by the appellants and not refuted by the state
or a university.384 Other courts do require evidence, but there is by
no means a consistent requirement.
Third, the cases evidence a variety of underlying intuitions
about anonymity and mask-wearing. These reactions range from a
statement that anonymity does not per se adversely affect any
legitimate state interest in Ghafari, to observing that mask-wearing
inherently creates a climate of fear, in Miller.385 The underlying
understanding of the nature of anonymity is frequently the basis for
whether additional intent is required. However, after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Virginia v. Black, it is clear that a state cannot
regulate mask-wearing solely because it is frightening to other
people.386
Fourth, courts handle the division between anonymity’s
functional aspects and communicative aspects interestingly.387 The
First Amendment claim does not hinge solely on whether the mask
is expressive conduct.388 In Aryan, the fact that masks serve a
function actually did not destroy the First Amendment argument; it
bolstered it.389 Because mask-wearing permits free speech and
association, it is protected under NAACP.390 But the functional

383
See Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 93–94 (N.D. Tex. 1978); Ghafari v. Mun.
Ct. for S.F. Jud. Dist. of S.F., 87 Cal. App. 3d 255, 261 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
384
See Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 93–94; Ghafari, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 261.
385
See State v. Miller, 260 Ga. 669, 672 (Ga. 1990); Ghafari, 87 Cal. App. 3d at 262.
386
See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 362 (2003) (finding that a statute banning cross
burning with intent to intimidate does not violate the First Amendment).
387
See, e.g., Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 92.
388
See id. at 92.
389
See id.
390
See id. at 91 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462–63 (1958)).
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element of anonymity is used in other cases to justify not applying
the First Amendment at all.391
Finally, it is worth noting how widely the splits between courts
are developing. Both state and federal courts have declared the
anti-mask
laws
of
California,
Florida,
and
Texas
unconstitutional.392 City ordinances have also been overturned, in
Tennessee and Indiana.393 Georgia’s statute has been upheld, but
with a vastly limiting construction that may now turn out after
Virginia v. Black to prevent the application of the law entirely.394
However, the Second Circuit refused to extend the right to
anonymity past disclosure requirements by the state, and described
anti-mask laws as regulating function, only.395 And the Eastern
District of Virginia agreed.396
IV. ANTI-MASK CASE LAW APPLIED TO REAL NAME POLICIES
ONLINE
This Part brings lessons from the real world into the discussion
of anonymity online. The Supreme Court has established that
door-to-door petitioners may not be subject to identity registration
requirements in the real world.397 The question is whether this rule
changes online, where speech can be truly untraceable.398
Untraceable online speech implicates a strong state interest in law
enforcement, arguably stronger than the state’s interest in
registering door-to-door petitioners offline. Could the government
in the United States constitutionally require that all online speakers
391

See, e.g., State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 552–53 (Ga. 1990).
See Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 94 (N.D. Tex.1978); Robinson v. State, 393
So. 2d 1076, 1077 (Fla. 1981); Ghafari v. Mun. Ct. for the S.F. Jud. Dist. of S.F., 87 Cal.
App. 3d 255, 259 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).
393
See Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. City of Goshen, 50 F. Supp. 2d 835, 840
(N.D. Ind. 1999); Ku Klux Klan v. MLK Worshippers, 735 F. Supp. 745, 751 (M.D.
Tenn. 1990).
394
See Miller, 398 S.E.2d at 550.
395
See Church of the Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 208 (2d
Cir. 2004).
396
See Hernandez v. Superintendent, 800 F.Supp. 1344, 1351 (E.D. Va. 1992).
397
See Watchtower Bible v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 168 (2002); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60, 63 (1960).
398
See Brenner, supra note 184, at 4.
392
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register their identities, justifying that registration requirement with
a strong state interest in law enforcement?
This question is not merely a hypothetical; online real name
policies have received considerable attention from governments in
recent years, even in the United States. This Part addresses online
real name policies, and asks whether the Doe literature addresses
them. Concluding that the Doe scholarship does not adequately
address the prospect of online real name policies, this Part brings
to bear the anti-mask case law discussed in Part III.
A. Real Name Policies
Online real-name policies require self-identification while
speaking, or the registration of identity with either the government
or some layer in the communicative infrastructure such as an
Internet Service Provider (ISP). These policies vary in whether
they primarily address traceability, or directly prohibit anonymity.
Policies that prohibit anonymity apply to all layers of the
communication stack: the individual cannot speak without selfidentifying to everyone. Policies that address traceability do not
mandate that an individual speak under his real name; instead, they
require the individual to register identity with at least one party, so
that if he commits a crime or a tort, law enforcement will be able
to find him. The Tor-enabled “Silk Road” of illicit anonymous
online activities has prompted much discussion of banning
untraceable anonymity in the interest of preventing terrorism and
other crimes.399
In 2003, South Korea began enacting real name commenting
laws, which were first applied on political websites.400 The South
Korean government enacted these laws in the name of increasing
civility, and preventing harm to individuals from insidious
399

See Nicolas Christin, Traveling the Silk Road: A Measurement Analysis of a Large
Anonymous Online Marketplace (Carnegie Mellon University Working Paper, 2012),
available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1207.7139 (arguing that illegal Internet marketplaces,
frequented by anonymous users, make it difficult for law enforcement agents to track the
purchasing of weapons and narcotics).
400
Gregory Ferenstein, Surprisingly Good Evidence that Real Name Policies Fail to
Improve Comments, TECHCRUNCH (July 29, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/
07/29/surprisingly-good-evidence-that-real-name-policies-fail-to-improve-comments.
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anonymous comments.401 In 2007, South Korea temporarily
required that all websites of a certain size mandate the use of real
names by their viewers and commenters.402 Users were required to
verify their identities by submitting their Resident Registration
Numbers (RRNs), which are roughly equivalent to social security
numbers.403 The policy proved to have surprisingly little impact
on cleaning up abusive commentary—a change of .09%, in a study
done by the Korean Communications Commission.404 But it
resulted in a security breach in which identity information for
thirty-five million users was stolen from two popular websites.405
South Korea decided to abandon the “real-name system” in August
2011.406
In early 2012, China decided to expand its online
accountability regulations, requiring users of microblogging
services to use their own names.407 Unlike in South Korea, this
policy does not require a user to display her real name while
speaking.408 Instead, the user’s national identification information
is stored in her account.409 China’s policy is an example of a realname policy targeting dissidents, but not civility.410 Some argue
that while this identification requirement is bad, it may be better
than the other alternative, which is banning the technology of
microblogging altogether.411
401

Id.
Timothy Lee, South Korea’s “Real Names” Debacle and the Virtues of Online
Anonymity, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 15, 2011, 02:45 PM), http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/2011/08/what-south-korea-can-teach-us-about-online-anonymity.
403
Id.
404
Ferenstein, supra note 400.
405
Xeni Jardin, South Korea to Abandon “Real Name” Internet Policy, BOING BOING
(Aug. 12, 2012, 12:09 AM), http://boingboing.net/2011/08/12/south-korea-to-abandonreal-name-internet-policy.html.
406
Id.
407
J. Angelo Racoma, China to Enforce Real Name Policy for Microblogging,
Claiming
“Online
Accountability,
CMSWIRE
(Jan.
23,
2012),
http://www.cmswire.com/cms/social-business/china-to-enforce-real-name-policy-formicroblogging-claiming-online-accountability-014211.php.
408
Id.
409
Id.
410
Id.
411
J. Angelo Racoma, China to Enforce Real Name Policy for Microblogging,
Claiming “Online Accountability,” CMSWIRE (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.cmswire.com/
402
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Calls for real-name policies are increasingly the routine after
high-profile criminal acts. In Germany, the Interior Minister
argued for real-name policies, alleging that the recent Norwegian
shooter had been inspired by a pseudonymous anti-Muslim
blogger.412 In the wake of the recent Aurora, Colorado shooting,
the AMC theater chain banned masks in their movie theaters.413
The reasoning was that costumes “make other guests feel
uncomfortable.”414
The discussion is playing out in the private sphere as well. Out
of a combination of business interests and civility concerns,
Google+ and Facebook require the use of real names, and
newspapers are turning to real-name commentary policies.415
However, the advent of new video obscuring technology
recognizes the necessity of anonymity for dissident behavior.416
As we increasingly move towards video as a form of
communication, online anonymity takes on new forms. YouTube
now provides a face-blurring tool for online videos, to protect
dissidents in oppressive regimes.417 Anti-mask laws may in fact be
more than an analogue—they may have direct online application to
the obscuring of identity in online videos.
The question of state-mandated real-name policies has come up
several times in the United States. Mandatory key escrow was
discussed during the Clinton era, in debate over the controversial
Clipper Chip.418 Froomkin pointed out that mandatory key escrow
would chill “speech by persons who seek to remain either secure or

cms/social-business/china-to-enforce-real-name-policy-for-microblogging-claimingonline-accountability-014211.php?pageNum=2.
412
Lee, supra note 402.
413
AMC Bans Masks, Fake Weapons in Theaters, CBSCHICAGO (July 20, 2012),
http://chicago.cbslocal.com/2012/07/20/amc-bans-masks-fake-weapons-in-theaters.
414
Id.
415
Kaminski, supra note 29, at 14.
416
Eyder Peralta, To Help Dissidents, YouTube Introduces Face-Blurring Tool, NPR
(July 18, 2012), http://m.npr.org/news/Technology/156987232.
417
Neal Ungerleider, YouTube Introduces Face-Blurring Tool, FAST COMPANY (July
18, 2012), http://www.fastcompany.com/1843123/youtube-introduces-face-blurring-tool.
418
See Froomkin, The Clipperchip, supra note 202, at 809.
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anonymous when speaking, whether for fear of retribution or other
reasons.”419
More recently, two identical New York legislative proposals—
Senate Bill 6779 and Assembly Bill 8688—would require web
administrators to take down any online postings to which the writer
has not attached his name.420 If the anonymous poster agrees to
attach his or her name and confirms the accuracy of his or her IP
address and home address, then the posting can remain up.421
The New York laws may have been proposed by referring to an
anti-mask case. As discussed above, in Kerik, the Second Circuit
held that wearing a mask was not protected by the First
Amendment.422 The New York legislature may have reasoned that
the two online real name policy proposals would be constitutional,
relying on Kerik.
B. The Doe Literature
Most scholarly work on online anonymity does not address real
name policies; it concerns the establishment of a standard for
unmasking online defendants through the civil subpoena process.
Cases about this standard are often referred to as Doe or Dendrite
cases, after an early New Jersey case that established a prominent
version of the subpoena standard.423
In a Doe case, a civil plaintiff argues to the court that their case
necessitates the revelation of the identity of the anonymous
defendant.424
The process usually involves two steps of
subpoenas: one to the Online Service Provider (OSP), or website,
to get the identifying number (or Internet Protocol address) used by
419

Id. at 813.
See Gene Policinski, N.Y. Bills Would Squelch Anonymity Online, FIRST
AMENDMENT CENTER (May 24, 2012), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/n-y-billswould-squelch-anonymity-online.
421
Tecca, N.Y Senate Bill Seeks to End Anonymous Internet Posting, YAHOO! NEWS
(May 24, 2012), http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/technology-blog/york-senate-bill-seeksend-anonymous-internet-posting-162549128.html.
422
See Church of Am. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan v. Kerik, 356 F.3d 197, 208 (2d
Cir. 2004).
423
Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 759 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001).
424
See, e.g., Ekstrand, supra note 37, at 405.
420
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the anonymous speaker; and a second to the Internet Service
Provider (ISP) to connect that identifying number with an
individual’s account and real name.425 The scholarly literature on
Doe primarily concerns the establishment of an appropriate
procedural standard for these unmaskings, coupled with concern
that these subpoenas have been used by large companies and others
to chill defendants’ speech through the subpoena process without
bringing legitimate cases to fruition.426
Whatever the disagreements about the details, the consensus
among scholars is that First Amendment “protections for
anonymous speech are not absolute.”427 This protection as applied
to Doe cases has famously been referred to as a “qualified
privilege.”428
To understand what this means in the Doe context, it may help
to look to the different forms of the reporter’s privilege, which has
been compared by some to the Doe or Dendrite standard.429 A few
reporter’s shield statutes—including the first such statute, which
was enacted in Maryland in 1896—provide “an absolute shield to
reporters from forced disclosure of their confidential sources.”430
Once the privilege is recognized, a reporter is shielded from
disclosure “even when subpoenaed to testify before a grand
jury.”431 However, most state laws provide a qualified reporter’s
privilege, not an absolute privilege.432 In a typical state shield
statute, a party may overcome the reporter’s privilege by showing
that the information “is relevant and material to the unresolved
issues,” “cannot be obtained from alternative sources,” and that a
“compelling interest exists for requiring disclosure of the
information.”433

425
426
427
428
429
430
431
432
433

See Gleicher, supra note 28, at 328.
See Lidsky, Silencing John Doe, supra note 36, at 859–60.
Ekstrand, supra note 37, at 407.
Id. at 425.
See Hanamirian, supra note 90, at 120, 134.
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 130.
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It took time for the reporter’s privilege standard to be imported
into the Dendrite context, where it was modified to be arguably
more protective.434 One scholar suggested using the opinion
privilege and other First Amendment defenses to protect the
identity of online John Does accused of libel by big companies.435
A 2003 article acknowledged that “the new guidelines [used by
courts] look much like the law of reporter’s privilege.”436 In fact,
an interview with Paul Levy, the attorney credited with building
the Dendrite test, indicates that he deliberately crafted the standard
out of the reporter’s privilege.437 In 2007, two scholars made a
forceful argument for why the privilege standard should be used in
the Doe cases.438
More recent articles have focused on the discrepancy between
the emerging subpoena standards and attempted to offer a unifying
standard. There are between seven and ten recognized tests for
online John Doe subpoenas.439 Perhaps the most famous, the
Dendrite test, requires the plaintiff to (1) notify the anonymous
speaker of the subpoena; (2) identify the allegedly actionable
speech; and (3) state a prima facie cause of action, producing

434

Id. at 134 (noting that “[a] recent New Hampshire Supreme Court opinion,
juxtaposing the Dendrite standard with the state’s qualified reporter’s privilege analysis,
demonstrates that, at least in the core area of defamation cases, anonymous posters may
have the legal upper hand”).
435
See Lidsky, Silencing John Doe, supra note 36, at 919 (noting that “[t]he First
Amendment extends a privilege to statements that do not imply an assertion of objective
fact, either because such statements ‘cannot “reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual
facts”’ or because such statements are not provably false. This privilege, the opinion
privilege, has the potential to protect Internet discourse from wealthy and powerful
plaintiffs who attempt to use defamation law to intimidate their online critics into
silence”).
436
Ekstrand, supra note 37, at 409.
437
Hanamirian, supra note 90, at 121–22 (quoting Paul Levy as having said, “We
created our [Dendrite] standard out of your source cases”).
438
See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1599–1600.
439
See, e.g., Gleicher, supra note 28, at 337 (noting that “[o]ver the past decade, courts
have adopted at least seven standards for evaluating John Doe subpoenas”); see also
Ashley I. Kissinger & Katharine Larsen, Protections for Anonymous Online Speech,
PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, COURSE HANDBOOK, 815, 826–39 (2011) (surveying legal
protections for anonymous online speakers and listing over ten distinct tests for
unmasking an anonymous poster).

C02_KAMINSKI (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

REAL MASKS AND REAL NAME POLICIES

4/17/2013 2:41 PM

883

sufficient evidence to support each element.440 The court then
balances the strength of the case and the necessity for disclosure
against the defendant’s First Amendment right of anonymous free
speech.441
Variations on the Dendrite test operate on at least six axes.442
These include varying standards of requirements for: notice,
argument strength, relevance of the identity, specificity on the
actionable speech, and exhaustion of other resources.443 Some
courts do not employ a balancing test.
On the other side of the debate, several scholars have suggested
that no additional procedural protection is necessary for online
Does.444
What is interesting about the Doe or Dendrite scholarship is its
general consensus that the First Amendment requires a balancing
test of speech against a prima facie case. There is little discussion,
however, of how courts might protect online anonymity outside of
the subpoena context.
1. How Past Commentators Have Handled Anti-Mask Laws
At least three authors writing about online anonymous speech
have addressed the anti-mask cases. Most of these treatments,
however, have been very brief. Two scholars simply reserved antimask laws for future evaluation, summing up the cases as follows:
the anti-mask laws “may chill some speech but may conceivably
be justified as anti-intimidation measures.”445
Both Froomkin and Susan W. Brenner give more time to antimask cases. Brenner describes masks as “a good real world
analogue for anonymity achieved via cyberspace.”446 She explains
440
See Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001).
441
See id.
442
Gleicher, supra note 28, at 343 (displaying a chart of cases and the factors weighed
by each court).
443
Id.
444
See, e.g., Michael S. Vogel, Unmasking “John Doe” Defendants: The Case Against
Excessive Hand-Wringing over Legal Standards, 83 OR. L. REV. 795, 855–56 (2004).
445
Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1590 n.237.
446
Brenner, supra note 184, at 1.
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that masks permit a person to conceal identifying information in
the real world, just as technologies enable identity obfuscation
online.
Brenner briefly summarizes anti-mask case law as indicating
that the First Amendment protects the wearing of masks under two
circumstances: when “the masks themselves have expressive
content or whenever ‘there is such a nexus between anonymity and
speech that a bar on the first is tantamount to a prohibition on the
second.’”447 As discussed above, the scope of First Amendment
protection from anti-mask laws is broader; the nexus between
anonymity and speech need not be as strong as Brenner suggests.
Courts have used additional justifications for protecting maskwearers, by finding that anti-mask laws regulate the content of
speech, and have found that masks can be symbolic without
conveying a highly particularized message.448 The spectrum of
anti-mask law is also more complex, since a number of courts
chose not to give First Amendment protection to mask-wearing at
all.
Brenner suggests that one possible approach to online
anonymity would be to mimic a particular category of anti-mask
laws and “criminalize on-line anonymity when it is used, or
intended to be used, for the purpose of engaging in illegal acts.”449
This could be done by outlawing the use of online anonymity for
committing a crime, or by making the use of online anonymity an
aggravating factor in sentencing.450
While Brenner’s use of the anti-mask statutes suggests one
resolution to the problem of regulating anonymity online, it does
not address the constitutionality of real-name policies. One could
extrapolate from Brenner’s summary of the First Amendment
arguments that online anonymity would be protected only (a) if the
mask is expressive, or (b) where the speaker can show that banning
the mask would be equivalent to banning the speech.451 Brenner’s
analysis does provide one firm conclusion: that a policy penalizing
447
448
449
450
451

Id. at 146–47 (quoting Aryan v. Mackey, 462 F. Supp. 90, 92 (N.D. Tex. 1978)).
See infra Part III.B.
Brenner, supra note 184, at 147–48.
Id. at 148–49.
Id. at 146–47.
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the use of anonymity for criminal acts only would probably be
constitutional.452 She does not discuss how this might be done in
practice.
There is another aspect worth noting about Brenner’s
discussion of anti-mask cases. For Brenner, there is a significant
difference between online and real-world anonymity. The central
question for Brenner is “whether the legal guarantee of anonymity,
crafted in the context of real world conduct, and the limitations on
that conduct, should encompass cyberworld conduct that is not
subject to those limitations.”453 In other words, Brennan believes
that real-world anonymity is almost always traceable, where online
anonymity can be untraceable.454 Brenner’s response to the
question about whether the difference between online and offline
anonymity matters is to both reject the conclusion that no
protection should be given to online anonymity, and to reject the
conclusion that unlimited protection should be given to online
anonymity.455 She reasons that the best approach is to address the
use of online anonymity for criminal purposes only; this suggests
that blanket real-name policies would not be acceptable to her.456
Froomkin has addressed the strict liability of general anti-mask
statutes from a legal realist’s perspective. He points out that the
Ku Klux Klan often loses, while protesting students win. Where
lower courts have upheld anti-mask laws because of the state
interest in preventing the crimes of violence and intimidation
associated with mask-wearing, they have balanced a history of
violence associated with mask-wearers against the First
Amendment, rather than actual contemporaneous threats.457

452
Id. (“Treating on-line anonymity as analogous to the wearing of masks in the
commission of criminal acts provides a clear standard for differentiating improper uses of
anonymity from proper uses. To achieve a conviction under this approach, the
prosecution would have to prove that the defendant purposely assumed anonymity, or
sought anonymity, for the purpose of committing a crime.”). Id. at 150.
453
See Brenner, supra note 184, at 144.
454
Id. at 142–43.
455
Id. at 144.
456
Id. at 147–48.
457
See Froomkin, The Clipperchip, supra note 202, at 821–22.
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Froomkin concludes that the “constitutionality of anti-mask laws
remains largely unsettled.”458
2. Why this Treatment Is Not Enough
There is thus a relatively sparse treatment of anti-mask laws in
the legal literature on online anonymity. As indicated above,
commentators vary in their understanding of Supreme Court case
law, leaving a significant number of doctrinal holes for anti-mask
cases to potentially fill.
For one, there is the question of whether McIntyre and Talley
protect only high-value political speech. Two scholars advocate
recognizing the Doe privilege only “in cases involving political or
other core speech.”459 The Dendrite cases would indicate that this
approach is not applied in practice, since courts apply the Doe
privilege regardless of whether the defendant makes high-value
political speech.460 The value of the speech, however, might arise
in the suggested balancing test, where courts might take the value
of the speech into account when determining the strength of the
First Amendment protection.
There is also a question of whether speakers must show a
likelihood retaliation to establish their right to anonymous
speech.461 The Dendrite formula presumes that speakers do not
need to show retaliation to be protected. This may be in part
because the focus of the Dendrite test is geared towards
determining whether the plaintiff’s case is real or strategic.462 It
does not require the defendant to show a probability of retaliation;
it requires the plaintiff to show that the suit itself is not
vindictive.463
458

Id. at 822–23.
See Lidsky & Cotter, supra note 27, at 1589–90 (“[L]egislatures and courts should
recognize a privilege to speak anonymously in cases involving political or other core
speech; a privilege that can only be overcome upon an exacting showing of need by
either the State or private litigants.”).
460
See supra Part IV.B.
461
See supra Part IV.B.
462
Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 767–68 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001).
463
Doe No. 1 v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 455 (Del. 2005) (applying a good faith standard
in order to obtain Doe’s identity).
459
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More generally, the Dendrite scholarship leaves open the
question of how the qualified privilege of anonymous speech will
play out in a nonprocedural context. Will it matter to the First
Amendment’s qualified protection of anonymity if anonymity is
untraceable?
It is also worth revisiting the anti-mask cases to counter
potential arguments that anti-mask cases wholeheartedly support
real-name policies. Because the dominant anti-mask case is the
Second Circuit’s recent decision in Kerik,464 it may be tempting for
scholars to conclude that anti-mask cases provide little to no
support against real name policies.465 However, as discussed, there
is significant disagreement in courts over the scope of First
Amendment protection for mask-wearers, with substantial support
for an expressive right to anonymity.466 And while legal realism
certainly does play a role—courts do sometimes cast a cold eye on
the Ku Klux Klan—there is substantial legal reasoning in these
cases that can be of value when turning to an analysis of real-name
policies.
C. What Anti-Mask Doctrine Adds
Part III’s analysis of anti-mask case law demonstrated a
number of points of interest in evaluating online real name
policies. The anti-mask cases indicate a judicial atmosphere often
recognizes that anonymity is a First Amendment right or a right
closely entwined with free expression. Despite the breadth of the
court split in anti-mask cases, there is a generally common
understanding that anonymity is valuable and should in at least
464

356 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2004).
See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, The Dangers of Fighting Terrorism with
Technocommunitarianism: Constitutional Protections of Free Expression, Exploration,
and Unmonitored Activity in Urban Spaces, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 677, 714 (2005)
(“The best account of Kerik is that, while the First Amendment does give people a right
to remain unidentified in many circumstances, it does not give them a right to become
unidentifiable and untraceable. This distinction between anonymity and untraceability
parallels the distinction that exists in the wiretapping context between the right to avoid
being wire-tapped (without probable cause) and the right to make one's telephone
facilities ‘wire-tap proof.’”).
466
See, e.g., Aryan v. Mackey, 463 F. Supp. 90, 92 (N.D. Tex. 1978) (holding that
masks worn by protestors were expressive and should be protected under the First
Amendment).
465
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some circumstances be protected as a speech right or as an aspect
of speech. Even before McIntyre, anonymity was thus recognized
as a function that has a nexus with free expression, and as a
medium for speech that otherwise would not be heard.
If speakers are required to show harm before their First
Amendment right to anonymity could be protected, then real name
policies would be constitutional as applied to many, since not
every speaker can show harm. However, the anti-mask cases show
that a number of courts have felt perfectly comfortable assuming
that chilling effects will occur, in the absence of a specific showing
by individuals.467
Anti-mask cases also instruct us that the state should not be
permitted to include the nature of anonymity as part of state
interests, to be balanced against the speaker’s First Amendment
rights. As the anti-mask cases show, courts often invoke the
“intimidating” nature of anonymity as a stand-in for showing that
the speaker in fact had intent to carry out a threat.468 After
Virginia v. Black, this cannot be an adequate state interest in the
absence of a true threat or other real harm. Thus, courts should be
cautioned against allowing states to regulate anonymity because it
is inherently bad, and should look instead to showings of a real,
concrete state interest. This counsels towards narrowly tailored
statutes, supported by a state showing of a concrete compelling
interest linked to anonymity, rather than a blanket prohibition on
anonymity generally.
Anonymity’s inherent functionality should not get in the way
of protecting against real-name policies. In the anti-mask cases,
anonymity’s functionality was itself seen as a distributive method
cementing the nexus between anonymity and speech, rather than
exempting anonymity from the coverage of the First
Amendment.469 Moreover, the Supreme Court’s recent statements
about elocutionary acts in Doe v. Reed indicate that it will be

467
468
469

See, e.g., Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 92.
See, e.g., State v. Miller, 398 S.E.2d 547, 553 (Ga. 1990).
See, e.g., Aryan, 462 F. Supp. at 92.
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reluctant to exempt speech from First Amendment coverage solely
because that speech also serves a non-expressive function.470
Wholesale online registration requirements should thus be
unconstitutional as overly broad. In large part, I arrive at this
conclusion out of a concern for unequal distribution of power
between the state and its citizens. This rationale is behind the
Supreme Court’s earlier bans on government licensing and inperson registration requirements.471
Where the state has significantly stronger interests, however, a
narrowly tailored real-name policy might be permissible. Thus, a
real-name policy for commercial speech might be constitutional.
A real-name policy that specifically targeted fraud could be
constitutional. For libel cases, however, the fact that outcomes are
usually in defendants’ favor counsels against crafting an overly
broad registration requirement in the name of preventing libel,
sacrificing a First Amendment right for cases that are rarely
won.472
Several anti-mask cases suggest that masked speech is just one
method of speaking, and speakers can be required to express
themselves through other means than masking, as long as those
other means are available. The Supreme Court in Reno v. ACLU
explained that subjecting online regulations to such a time, place,
and manner analysis is particularly dangerous. “[O]ne is not to
have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places
abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other
place.”473
V. REAL MASKS AND REMOTE BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION
This Article has discussed the implications of case law on real
masks in the real world for real name policies online. This Part
switches tacks. It turns out that recently developed online Doe
470

See Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 2812 (2010).
See Watchtower Bible v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 162 (2002); Talley v.
California, 362 U.S. 60, 63, 65 (1960).
472
See Froomkin, Silencing John Doe, supra note 12, at 861.
473
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (quoting Schneider v. State of N.J. (Town of
Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939)).
471
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case law has implications for the regulation of masks in the real
world.
Part III identified a significant split in the anti-mask case law.
Some courts recognize that general anti-mask statutes impinge on
freedom of expression; others do not. The convergence of Doe
case law suggests that courts now may be more willing to
recognize an underlying right to anonymity that could also be more
consistently applied offline.474
Real world anonymity has increasing significance.475 Since
September 2001, the federal government has increased its efforts to
compile and employ biometric information, through technologies
such as facial recognition technology.476 When partnered with
increased video surveillance, these technologies allow the
government to “ascertain the identity (1) of multiple people; (2) at
a distance; (3) in public space; (4) absent notice and consent; and
(5) in a continuous and on-going manner.”477 In February 2012,
Congress mandated that the Federal Aviation Administration speed
up the certification process for law enforcement agencies to obtain
access to unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), colloquially known as
drones.478 Drones, like other aircraft, are capable of carrying highend video cameras; but drones are also significantly less expensive
than other aircraft, sparking fears of ubiquitous aerial video
surveillance by the government.479
Ubiquitous video surveillance coupled with remote biometric
identification may significantly chill expressive activity in the real

474
See, e.g., Doe v. Reed, 586 F.3d 671, 681 n.10 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d sub nom. John
Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010); Dendrite Int’l, Inc. v. Doe, No. 3, 775 A.2d
756, 760 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514
U.S. 334, 357 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
475
See Blitz, supra note 465, at 714.
476
See Donohue, supra note 9, at 415 (“Facial recognition represents the first of a series
of next generation biometrics, such as hand geometry, iris, vascular patterns, hormones,
and gait, which, when paired with surveillance of public space, give rise to unique and
novel questions of law and policy.”).
477
Id. at 415.
478
See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11
(2012).
479
See M. Ryan Calo, The Drone as Privacy Catalyst, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 29
(2011), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/drone-privacy-catalyst.
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world. While the Supreme Court recently ruled that warrantless
location tracking through installation of a GPS device onto a car
violates the Fourth Amendment, earlier Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence on aerial surveillance states that no warrant is
necessary for aerial surveillance.480
The Doe jurisprudence teaches us that the First Amendment, in
addition to the Fourth Amendment, should protect individuals who
choose to mask themselves in public in order to participate in
expressive or associational activity. It should not just be limited to
people who wear symbolic masks.
For example, if a stockbroker participates in an Occupy Wall
Street rally, the First Amendment should protect her decision to
hide her identity under a Guy Fawkes mask not just because the
mask is symbolic, but because she concertedly wishes to be
anonymous. The Guy Fawkes mask is likely protected by the First
Amendment under the O’Brien test, having become associated
with an “anti-establishment message [that] has been embraced by
the Wall Street occupiers.”481 However, broader First Amendment
concerns should protect the wearing of any mask, even a
minimally symbolic one. Without a mask, the stockbroker’s
identifiability could provide leverage to those who wish to retaliate
against her in the future by imperiling her career.482 The concern
sparked by such identifiability is that “government spying could
lead to a world in which the government could run a search
through the database to find something—just one thing—you wish
it had not seen.”483 This concern could significantly chill
expressive activity.
480

United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). But see Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445
(1989) (finding that helicopter surveillance at four hundred feer did not constitute a
search under the Fourth Amendment).
481
See Tim Murphy, Guy Fawkes Gets a Last Laugh, 500 Years Later, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 27 2011), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/fashion/guy-fawkesmask-is-big-on-wall-street-and-halloween.html (noting that “it was the ‘hactivist’
collective, Anonymous, that imbued [the mask] with real-life symbolism”).
482
See id. (quoting unemployed stockbroker Sid Hiltunen who attended an Occupy
Wall Street rally: “If you want to show your support but are afraid you’ll lose your job,
just wear a mask”).
483
Priscilla Smith, Much Ado About Mosaics: How Original Principles Apply to
Evolving Technology in United States v. Jones, 14 N.C. J. L.& TECH (forthcoming 2013),
available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2233561, at 21.
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The Doe case law recognizes that identifiability can chill
expression, regardless of the symbolism inherent in the mask.
Anti-mask case law, by contrast, is limited by its frequent focus on
the O’Brien test. In anti-mask case law, courts often focus on
whether the mask is symbolic enough to deserve First Amendment
protection. The Doe case law, however, implies a broader
understanding of anonymity’s expressive implications.
The Doe subpoena standard establishes a version of First
Amendment due process for unmaskings. First Amendment due
process requires heightened process where First Amendment rights
are implicated.484 The most famous version of First Amendment
due process is the ban on prior restraints. Under the doctrine of
prior restraints, the government usually may not ban speech before
a judicial determination that a law has been violated.485 Even
potentially obscene material, which is not protected by the First
Amendment, is subject to heightened process protections until a
court determines that it is in fact obscene.486
Similarly, the Doe standard requires heightened process
compared to a usual subpoena, requiring notice to the defendant
and showing of a prima facie case, and often balancing the First
Amendment right to anonymity against the strength of the case.
The Doe standard thus resembles the prior restraint doctrine by
requiring a showing of some crime or tort before a FirstAmendment-protected activity can be banned. This suggests that
expressive anonymity, like other speech, may be banned only
when a state shows that a distinct crime has been committed, as
demonstrated by the state or private actor. The Doe standard thus
suggests that general anti-mask statutes are not constitutional,
while more targeted state statutes banning anonymity that enables
other crimes are acceptable
Permitting states to ban mask-wearing in the real world
implicates expressive anonymity, even when the mask is not
484
See generally Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147 (1998) (explaining that
preliminary injunctions are usually considered unconstitutional under the First
Amendment, but not in the copyright context).
485
See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722–23 (1931).
486
See Freeman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58–60 (1965).
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symbolic and there is no clear fear of retaliation. Anonymity may
be expressive when the mask wearer is attempting to hide her
identity en route to an associational or expressive event.
Anonymity may also be expressive when the mask wearer is
exercising her freedom to peaceably assemble. Anonymity could
even be expressive when the mask wearer shows that she is
wearing the mask specifically in order to be anonymous, using the
mask to declare to people around her that “I am unknown.” The
state should not be permitted to arrest a protestor solely because
she has covered her face. The Doe standard suggests, again, that
the protester may be unmasked only if the state can show evidence
that she has committed a distinct crime.
There is a recent example of mask use that specifically
addresses real world anonymity as an expressive tool. In early
2013, artist Adam Harvey created a line of “Stealth Wear”
clothing, including an “anti-drone hoodie” that masks thermal
imaging used by drones to spot people.487 The clothing, including
an “anti-drone scarf,” was created as a commentary on increased
government use of surveillance technologies. But if it were to be
worn in the real world, such a face-covering scarf might violate
general anti-mask laws because it intentionally conceals the face.
It does not fall into a customary exception, such as a Halloween
costume or a costume for a masked ball. Stealth Wear is clothing
designed specifically to create the kind of anonymity that people
could once achieve by walking in a large group through a large
city. As surveillance becomes more and more common, anti-mask
statutes should be looked at with greater scrutiny, and courts
should apply the First Amendment to them with an eye to the idea
that masks need not be symbolic speech for mask-wearing to
constitute expressive anonymity.

487

See Ryan Gallagher, The Anti-Surveillance Clothing Line that Promises to Thwart
Cell
Tracking
and
Drones,
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(Jan.
11,
2013,
2:57
PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/01/11/stealth_wear_adam_harvey_s_clothi
ng_line_safeguards_against_surveillance.html).
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VI. WHAT THE INTERNET AND FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY HAVE IN
COMMON
Ultimately, the core of the expressive right to anonymity is
about power. Individuals have more power when they organize as
an anonymous group against a government than when they act as
easily identifiable individual targets. And historically, large
assemblies in real physical space have functionally enabled most
of their participants to remain anonymous.488 Anonymous speech
has also permitted assemblies to start, by protecting channels of
information distribution that are accessible by and to all people.
The Supreme Court has not ignored the connection between
anonymity and assembly.489 In Talley, the Court noted that “a
requirement of registration in order to make a public speech would
seem generally incompatible with an exercise of the rights of free
speech and free assembly.”490 Assembly thrives on spontaneity,
and is fed by particular forms of communication, both of which are
protected by anonymity. The Talley Court relatedly noted the
historic value of the medium of pamphleteering.491 Pamphlets
have been “historic weapons in the defense of liberty,”492 part of a
right to express oneself in the street in an orderly fashion by
“handbills and literature as well as by the spoken word.”493
Pamphleteering is a way of communicating ideas to the broadest
possible group, in a public space, and as such is both a precursor to
assembly and entwined with assembly in public spaces.
This historical metaphor—of anonymous handbills passed out
to one’s peers in the street—is highly salient online. The Internet
488
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489
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can be an empowering technology for individuals who wish to
gather groups, whether virtual or real, to criticize the powerful
majority, since the broadcasting ability online is in the hands of
anybody who posts.494 After decades of big media, the Internet is
“capable of becoming a radically democratizing tool” because it
offers “cheap one-to-many communication.”495 As one author
noted, the “promise of the Internet is empowerment: it empowers
ordinary individuals with limited financial resources to ‘publish’
their views on matters of public concern . . . allowing more
democratic participation in public discourse.”496 From a cultural
democratic view of the First Amendment, then, the fact that
anonymous speech is taking place online should afford it
significant First Amendment protection.497
The Supreme Court has in other places linked anonymity to
populist distribution methods.
In Watchtower, the Court
emphasized the democratic nature of the particular method of
distribution, finding that past cases “discuss extensively the
historical importance of door-to-door canvassing and
pamphleteering as vehicles for the dissemination of ideas,”498 a
method that is “essential to the poorly financed causes of little
people.”499
The Court found that door-to-door anonymous
pamphleteering was worth protecting as a particularly valuable
avenue for speech by the non-elite.
The same argument could be made about online speech: it is
one of the few avenues of distribution of expression that is open to
“little people,” rather than controlled by big media conglomerates.
In recognizing the significance of protecting a particular
distributive method because of its accessibility to non-elites, the
Court in Watchtower laid the groundwork for a heightened—or at
least equal—protection for online forums. It also laid the
494

Froomkin, Flood Control, supra note 12, at 408 (stating that “given the ability to
broadcast messages widely using the Internet, anonymous e-mail may become the
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495
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496
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497
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499
Id. at 163 (quoting Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144–46 (1943)).
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groundwork for scrutiny of how anonymity interacts with access to
one-to-many communication in the real world.
Anonymity thus has played and continues to play a significant
role in both online and offline assembly and the related topic of
one-to-many communication. The historical use of anonymity to
protect pamphleteers and door-to-door canvassers should show
how much political organization benefits from protection for
anonymity. The rise of the hactivist group Anonymous in both the
offline and online worlds demonstrates this continuing link
between mass information dissemination, assembly, and
anonymity both online and offline.500
CONCLUSION
Anti-mask case law provides insights about online real name
policies; and Doe case law gives us insights onto anti-mask laws.
The two bodies of law reinforce each other, suggesting that there is
a longer judicial history about and more robust judicial
development of protection for anonymity than many scholars
believe exists. Courts may thus be more amenable than previously
suggested to protecting anonymity as a way of protecting free
expression and association. This amenability is particularly
important as both online and offline expression becomes
increasingly traceable, and states attempt to reinforce that
traceability through law. Pure anonymity, both physical and
virtual, will become increasingly expressive as citizens choose to
employ it specifically to enable themselves to communicate and
associate unobserved.
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